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ABSTRACT 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (‘DMCA’) prevents unauthorized copying 
and distribution of digital copyright works by regulating devices that can be used to 
circumvent Digital Rights Management (‘DRM’) measures that are used to restrict 
access to those works.  A significant problem is that those devices, like many new 
technologies, have the potential to be used for both socially harmful and socially 
beneficial purposes.  There is no obvious way for Congress to regulate 
circumvention devices to prevent the social harms, while at the same time 
facilitating the social benefits they might provide.  Recent judicial interpretations of 
the DMCA have unsurprisingly erred on the side of harm-prevention to the 
detriment of potentially legitimate uses of circumvention devices.  Unlike previous 
scholarship, this article suggests that the answer to this dilemma is not necessarily 
to amend the DMCA to bolster legitimate use exceptions to the anti-circumvention 
provisions.  Instead, this article advocates resolving the problem through a new 
approach that takes socially beneficial uses of circumvention technologies outside 
the scope of the DMCA altogether.  The idea is to create a new administrative 
complaints mechanism that would support those seeking to make such uses of 
digitally encrypted copyright works by imposing legal obligations on copyright 
holders to facilitate those uses.  This approach has the added benefit of generating a 
significant amount of data about emerging social norms relating to the boundaries 
of the fair use doctrine that could be fed back into legislative and judicial processes 
as copyright law develops in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION
“While it may be too early to draw final conclusions, it is plain that DRM technologies, backed by laws 
like the DMCA, pose a serious potential threat to fair use.  While technical refinements may address or 
minimize some of the social costs that stem from an erosion of fair use, it is unlikely that they will entirely 
resolve the tension.”1
Imagine that you are a student of musicology.  Your professor has asked you to
research Alban Berg’s Violin Concerto for a term paper on atonal musical forms.  You 
are not remotely interested in Berg, violin concerti, or the atonal music movement.  In 
fact, you enrolled in the musicology course mainly because you were interested in 
meeting an attractive sophomore who you heard was taking the class.  However, you 
have to write the paper to complete the course.  
During a Google search on the topic, you notice an advertisement for a new online 
service that will allow you to listen to samples of recent recordings of various musical 
works, as well as to access recent commentaries on those works by leading musicologists.  
You are extremely interested in this service as you figure that it will probably cut your 
research time in half.  However, when you investigate further, you discover that the cost 
to access it is prohibitive on a student budget.  You mention the service to the professor 
and ask if there is some way she can get you free or discounted access to the service 
through the music department.  She tells you that she has been aware of this service for 
some time and she highly recommends it, but that the operators of the service do not 
1 Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use and Digital Rights Management:  Preliminary Thoughts on the 
(Irreconcilable?) Tension Between Them, available at:  http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/fair_use_and_drm.php, 
last viewed on April 8, 2005. 
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currently provide academic or student discounts.  She herself has had to spend a sizeable 
chunk of her own faculty budget on a subscription to the service.
This is obviously good news for you.  If the professor has access, presumably she 
can make copies for you and your classmates.  This is no different to her owning a vinyl 
record or audio cassette of a relevant music recording, and a hard copy book or journal of 
the expert commentaries in the good old days.  Surely she could have copied relevant 
portions of those things for her students, so presumably she can make digital copies from 
the online service today.  Unfortunately, it’s not that simple.
For one thing, even before digital technology hit the scene, the extent of your 
professor’s ability to make students copies of old fashioned media was not particularly 
clear cut.2 Over the years, laws3 and guidelines4 developed on this issue, but some student 
copying may always have amounted to copyright infringement.  It may merely have been
tolerated by content industries as a necessary inconvenience that could not be effectively 
policed.5 This is because it has traditionally been too difficult for content owners to 
police and enforce their copyrights in an aggressive way in all classrooms and private 
homes around the world. However, DRM technologies6 now allow content owners to
exercise more control over all unauthorized reproductions of their works.
Imagine, then, that the owner of the online service described above has imposed 
DRM measures to restrict access to, and copying of, the relevant music and commentaries
unless the appropriate fee has been paid.  Thus, your professor can access the relevant 
material provided that she maintains payment of her subscription fees, but she is 
physically unable to make a digital copy of the music or the commentary. Imagine 
further that the law does not technically prevent her from cracking the DRM measure and 
2 See RALPH S. BROWN and ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND 
RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP (8 ed, 2002), 436-443 (on 
classroom copying generally and the guidelines for classroom reproductions). 
 
3 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use in copyright law). 
 
4 Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions with 
respect to books and periodicals, March 19, 1967 (between Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law 
Revision, Author-Publisher Group, Authors League of America, Association of American Publishers Inc.), 
reproduced in Brown, supra note ___, 438-440; Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music, April 1976 
(between the Music Publishers' Association of the United States, Inc., the National Music Publishers' 
Association, Inc., the Music Teachers National Association, the Music Educators National Conference, the 
National Association of Schools of Music, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law Revision). 
 
5 See RALPH S. BROWN and ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND 
RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP (8 ed, 2002), 436-443 (on 
classroom copying generally and the guidelines for classroom reproductions); See also Princeton University 
Press v Michigan Document Service, 99 F 3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding copyright infringement for much 
larger scale university photocopying of ‘coursepacks’ than contemplated in the example here). 
 
6 One generally accepted definition of DRM systems is the ‘secure packaging and delivery software 
designed to prevent purchasers and third parties from making unauthorized uses of digital works’:  Dan 
Burk and Julie Cohen, Fair Use Infra-Structure for Rights Management, 15 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW 
AND TECHNOLOGY 41, 48 (2001). 
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make copies of the relevant material for students, assuming that she could establish the 
copying was for a ‘fair use’ purpose.7 Nevertheless, having devoted her life to 
musicology, she is no expert on decryption technology and is unable herself to crack the 
relevant code.  She needs some device or service that would help her to do so.  However, 
the aggressive enforcement of a new digital anti-piracy law has effectively put most 
companies out of business that used to manufacture and distribute the kind of technology 
she would need. The unavailability of these technologies also prevents you from 
cracking the code yourself in order to access the material you want without paying for it, 
again assuming you could establish a fair use purpose.  In any event, the new law would 
prohibit you from making unauthorized access even for a fair use purpose. 8
Your professor therefore suggests that you buy or borrow a recoding of the violin 
concerto, and that you go to the library and find some commentaries on the concerto.  
They may not be as good or as up-to-date as the online commentaries, but short of paying 
a large fee to subscribe to the online service for the purposes of writing one term paper, 
they are the best you can do.
In one sense, you are pretty annoyed with this outcome, particularly because you 
were trying to win a bet with your best friend to get through a whole semester without 
physically setting foot in the library.  On the other hand, you understand the reason why 
the online music service chose to restrict access to, and use of, its works in this way.  If it 
was not so restrictive, it could not protect its work and its business model against digital 
copyright pirates who could utilize digital media to make fast, cheap, and near perfect 
copies of its materials, and to distribute them globally at the push of a button with no 
compensation to the online music service.9
Hence, the DRM dilemma:  the question of how effectively digital technology 
might be regulated to prevent digital copyright piracy, while at the same time facilitating 
fair uses of digital copyright works.10 This is a fundamental issue in digital copyright law
which has serious implications for the balance of information access and use in many 
different fields and across national borders.  This article suggests that the issue needs to 
be addressed head on before a serious information imbalance arises in the global 
information society, to the extent that this is not already happening.  In so doing, it 
advocates a novel approach to protecting fair uses of digital copyright works by taking 
them outside the scope of digital copyright anti-piracy laws like the Digital Millennium 
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 
8 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 
9 The DMCA mirrors the content industries’ concerns here:  Dan Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse,
50 UCLA L REV 1095, 1135 (2003) (legislative aims behind the drafting of the DMCA were to prevent 
‘piracy’ in digital works); Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences:  Five Years Under 
the DMCA, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended_consequences.php, last viewed on March 
21, 2004 and on file with the author. 
 
10 Again, assuming that we have at least a vague idea of the boundaries and scope of the fair use 
doctrine.  This issue is discussed in more detail infra.
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Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and supporting them instead through a new administrative 
complaints mechanism.
These questions are separate to those recently addressed by the Supreme Court in 
MGM Studios v Grokster,11 although both problems are created by recent developments in 
digital technology, and both situations share some similar dynamics. The Grokster
litigation involved attempts by digital content industries to combat copyright 
infringements by unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing.12  The plaintiffs in that litigation, 
and other similar litigation,13 have sought to hold manufacturers and distributors of file 
sharing services secondarily liability for direct copyright infringements committed by the 
users of those services.  
The DRM dilemma addressed in this article, on the other hand, deals with 
something even more fundamental:  attempts by digital content industries to utilize 
technological encryption measures to control initial access to, as well as copying of, 
digital works.  As with the digital file sharing situation, these industries have employed a 
secondary liability strategy focused on third parties not directly involved in specific acts 
of copyright infringement.  In the case of the DRM dilemma, the third parties are those 
who manufacturer and distribute ‘circumvention’ devices: that is, devices that can be 
used to circumvent technological encryption measures utilized by content industries to 
control access to, and use of, their works. Unlike file sharing situations, the content 
industries required legislative support to create a new regime to hold these third parties 
responsible for the manufacture and distribution of such circumvention technologies.14
Although much recent digital copyright literature understandably focuses on 
Grokster, and the digital file sharing problem more generally, the DRM dilemma has 
much more serious implications for society, both nationally and globally, than the 
resolution of the digital file sharing issue.  This is because DRM technologies, bolstered 
by DRM-supporting legislation, pose a very serious threat to fair use because of their 
implications for accessing protected works. They effectively prevent many fair uses from 
ever taking place. Even though the aims of the DMCA are laudable, the regulation of 
circumvention technologies in this way seriously threatens to damage the pre-existing 
balance of interests in copyright works.
11 MGM Studios v Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (2004), appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
 
12 Alfred Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, forthcoming CASE WESTERN 
RESERVE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 2005 (detailed discussion of peer to peer file sharing and associated 
legal issues). 
 
13 See, for example, A&M v Napster, 239 F 3d 1004 (9th Cir, 2001); In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation, 334 F 3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 
14 Legislative support was also required to sanction individual acts of circumvention.  This support 
came in the form of a new Chapter 12 inserted into Title 17 of the United States Code in 1998 as part of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (‘DMCA’).  Unlike traditional copyright law, this legislation prohibits 
unauthorized access to digitally encrypted copyright works amongst other things.
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This is the heart of the DRM dilemma.  If circumvention devices are regulated in 
this way, fair use is under threat.  This means that the previously existing societal balance 
in relation to access and use of copyright works potentially falls apart.  However, if 
circumvention devices are not effectively regulated, digital content industries may be 
unable, or less able, to rely on encryption technologies that could protect their works 
against digital copyright piracy.15  This ultimately affects their business models and the 
prices for which, and contractual terms on which, they will be prepared to make digital 
works available to the public.
To date, the dilemma has been addressed in various ways.  The DMCA itself 
evidences a legislative intention to protect fair use.  The legislation expressly states that 
fair use rights are not intended to be affected by the operation of the DMCA.16  The 
DMCA also incorporates a triennial review to be conducted by the Librarian of Congress 
on the advice of the Register of Copyrights with a view to creating necessary exemptions 
for particular classes of works from the operation of certain aspects of the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA.17  None of these measures has proved 
particularly effective in practice to date as demonstrated infra.  
By contrast to the current approaches, this article suggests a new approach to the 
DRM dilemma.  It advocates preserving the current system with its emphasis on 
restricting trafficking in circumvention devices, while at the same time developing a 
separate administrative complaints mechanism for individual fair users to preserve 
particular fair uses of given works.  This would be different from the current approaches 
because it could be individually tailored to specific fair use complaints.  It would 
accommodate the timescale of individual fair users and their specific fair use needs.  
Unlike the triennial review, it would not be based on identifying classes of works that 
may be exempted from the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, nor would there 
be three year time lags between determinations.  This would prevent the balance of 
interests in digital copyright works from becoming too skewed against fair users while 
awaiting the next set of administrative determinations.  The new system would also 
impose affirmative legal duties on copyright holders to make access to given works 
available to those seeking to make a fair use of a relevant work.
Copyright holders would still be able to proceed against those trafficking in anti-
circumvention devices under the existing provisions of the DMCA.  The assumption here 
is that if a simple, inexpensive, individually tailored complaints procedure could be put in 
place to preserve fair use, there would be much less cause for concern about aggressive 
enforcement of the DMCA’s anti-trafficking provisions against those who manufacture 
and distribute circumvention devices.  If fair use could be protected in other ways without 
15 This is because all good encryption measures can ultimately be hacked even if it takes some time 
to do so.  At least legal sanctions against decryption provide some additional comfort to content industries 
who want to rely on digital encryption measures.  
 
16 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or 
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.”). 
17 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) – (D). 
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the potential fair user having to avail herself of such a device in the open market, there 
would be no reason to object to stringent enforcement of the anti-trafficking provisions.  
It would be reasonable to assume that much of the market for such devices would be to 
promote illegal digital piracy, provided that legitimate users of copyright works could 
effectively gain access to the works through the administrative procedure.
Another benefit of such a system is that it would generate data about emerging 
social norms relating to the boundaries of fair use in the digital age.  This data could be 
fed into the law reform process in catering to new challenges posed by digital technology 
that might threaten the existing balance of interests in digital copyright works.  
Additionally, such a system might ultimately encourage private settlement of complaints 
about lack of fair use to digital copyright works.  This is because one of the underlying 
assumptions of the system would be that fair use has to be accepted as an important part 
of the copyright structure and of the social bargain underlying the grant of a copyright.  If 
fair use was clearly accepted as a legal right, rather than as a mere defense to a copyright 
infringement action, it might create incentives for copyright holders to better 
accommodate fair users privately.  This may lead the market to create its own solutions to 
balancing these rights in due course, particularly after some data was generated by the 
administrative mechanism as to the boundaries of the fair use right in the digital age.
Part I sets out the relevant background to the enactment of the DMCA, including 
the legislative intentions in relation to fair use and judicial interpretations of the DMCA 
with respect to fair use.  Part II situates the problem in a broader global context and 
surveys similar legislation in other jurisdictions.  Given that the imbalance of rights under 
the DMCA is now being mirrored in other countries, it is imperative that law-makers 
globally start trying to re-align the balance of rights in digital copyright law as a matter of 
the highest priority.  If the United States Congress acts now, it can be a world leader in 
implementing such re-alignment strategies and will not be relegated to either following 
the lead of strategies gradually being developed in other jurisdictions,18 or creating 
approaches that do not sit well with those in other countries.  It is particularly important 
to address this problem with an eye to global harmonization because of the ease with 
which digital information can cross national borders.  Part III develops the contours of the 
new administrative complaints procedure in more detail, including the suggestion that the 
nature and scope of the fair use doctrine need to be more fully developed for the doctrine 
to be a meaningful part of copyright law in the digital age.  Part IV then draws 
conclusions from the observations made in the previous sections and sets out some ideas 
for future legal developments in aligning rights and interests in digital copyright works.
I. FAIR USE UNDER THE DMCA
A.  THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
18 For example, the new administrative complaints procedure adopted in 2003 in the United 
Kingdom – see infra.
THE DRM DILEMMA 
8
Concerned about the possibility that the advent of digital technology and its use in 
digital content industries could stifle, rather than promote, innovation, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’) adopted provisions in two 1996 treaties to 
protect content industries against digital piracy.19  The aim was to encourage treaty 
signatories to provide legal sanctions for unauthorized circumvention of DRM measures 
that encrypted a copyright work.20  The rationale was to bolster DRM measures protecting 
a copyright work with legal sanctions for unauthorized interference.  DRM measures did 
not have to be foolproof or unbreakable to attract legal protection.  Provided that the 
measure was sufficiently effective21 in operation to be categorized as an ‘effective 
technological protection measure’ under the relevant legislation, a legal remedy would be 
available to a content owner who claimed unauthorized access to, or use of, the work as a 
result of someone cracking a DRM system.  
This seems simple enough.  However, with the clear legislative focus on 
preventing unauthorized access to, and use of, digitally encrypted copyright works, the 
idea of protecting legitimate interests in copyright works against restrictive DRM 
measures seemed to be inadvertently sidelined.  This has meant that the protection of 
some legitimate interests in accessing and using digital copyright works has, to a 
significant extent, been lost in translation.  The ability of individuals to make fair uses of 
a digital copyright work, for example, has received inadequate protection under 
legislation that has been enacted to give effect to the relevant articles of the WIPO 
treaties.
Part of the reason for this, as demonstrated infra, is that unless fair use is accepted 
as a clear legal right to access and use a work, rather than as a mere defense to an act of 
copyright infringement, there is no way to effectively regulate circumvention 
technologies without encroaching on fair use.  Any legislation that prevents acts of 
circumvention or trafficking in circumvention devices will encroach on fair use if it does 
not additionally place affirmative obligations on copyright holders to make access and 
use of copyright works available to potential fair users for fair use purposes.  The only 
realistic way to place such affirmative obligations on copyright holders is to accept that 
fair use is a legally guaranteed right and not a mere tolerated convenience.  Otherwise, 
there is no legal basis for imposing affirmative obligations on copyright holders to 
facilitate fair use.
Although the imposition of such duties on copyright holders may seem like a new 
concept in copyright law that unfairly shifts the balance of interests away from copyright 
holders by lessening their power to control their works, it is, in fact, not such a conceptual 
19 The Copyright Treaty of 1996, and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996. 
 
20 WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, Art. 11; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996, 
Art. 18. 
21 See, for example, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B), providing that:  “a technological measure 
“effectively controls access to a work” if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the 
application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain 
access to the work.”
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stretch from the current law. It has never been clear that fair use is not a guaranteed legal 
right,22 although admittedly it has never been clear that it is such a right.23  However, it 
has always been assumed that fair use is an integral part of the social bargain under 
copyright law.  Along with the idea-expression dichotomy,24 fair use is an essential part of 
the balance of rights and interests to ensure an appropriate flow of information and ideas 
throughout society.  Thus, even if there were good reasons in the past for relegating fair 
use to the status of a defense to copyright infringement, the advent of digital technology 
that can be used to restrict access to copyright works, may require a shift in the thinking 
and an elevation of the defense to an independent right of action.  In other words, perhaps 
digital technology necessitates transforming fair use from a shield into a sword.  These 
ideas are taken up in more detail infra.
Following the requirements of the 1996 WIPO treaties, Congress drafted the 
DMCA which, amongst other things, inserted a new Chapter 12 into Title 17 of the 
U.S.C., giving effect to the relevant WIPO treaty requirements.  The WIPO Copyright 
Treaty of 1996 requires that:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection 
with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, 
which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted 
by law.25 
The WIPO Performances and Phonograms treaty makes similar provision in the 
context of relevant works.26 These treaties do not say anything more about the effect 
22 WILLIAM CORNISH and DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (5 ed, 2003) 808 (noting that British law has generally assumed that 
fair dealing exceptions to copyright infringement, the British equivalent to fair use, have generally been 
assumed to be constitutionally guaranteed rights of access and use, although there has historically been 
little actual debate about it); Sony Corporation v Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (majority and 
minority judges disagreed over the extent of transformative use necessary for finding of fair use). 
 
23 321 Studios v MGM Studios, 307 F Supp 2d 1085, 1011 (2004) (despite obiter comments in 
Supreme Court cases, it is not clear that fair use is a constitutionally guaranteed right). 
24 Nimmer on Copyright, §2.03[D] (copyright may be claimed in the ‘expression’ of a work but not 
in its underlying ‘idea’; this protects freedom of speech). 
 
25 WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, Art. 11.  See also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
of 1996, Art. 18, providing that:  “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by performers or 
producers of phonograms in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty and that restrict 
acts, in respect of their performances or phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers or the 
producers of phonograms concerned or permitted by law.”  
 
26 Art. 18:  “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies 
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by performers or producers of 
phonograms in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty and that restrict acts, in respect 
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these requirements might have on interests in copyright works such as fair use, other than 
the above statement that legal protection shall be available for DRM measures used to
restrict activities that are not ‘permitted by law’.  Thus, the drafters of the treaties seem to 
have implicitly assumed that the domestic implementation of the relevant treaty terms 
would not adversely impact activities that are permitted by law, such as fair use.
The new Chapter 12 of Title 17, hereinafter referred to somewhat generically as 
the ‘DMCA’, contains prohibitions on circumventing access-control measures,27 as well 
as trafficking in devices that can circumvent access-control28 and copy-control measures.29
These prohibitions attract both civil remedies30 and criminal penalties.31 There is, 
however, no specific restriction on circumventing a copy-control measure, because of the 
Congressional intention to preserve fair use in relation to copyright works.32  In fact, 
Congress inserted a provision into the DMCA to make this clear. Sub-section 1201(c)(1) 
of Title 17 provides that:  “Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, 
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.”33
Additionally, Sections 1201(a)(1)(B) to (D) of Title 17 set out an administrative 
procedure to exempt circumventions of access-control measures applied to certain classes 
of works from the provisions of § 1201(a)(1)(A).  This procedure requires the Librarian 
of Congress to make triennial determinations of relevant classes of works based on the 
advice of the Register of Copyrights.34 In particular, such determinations are intended to 
be made, taking into account some of the classic ‘fair use factors’35 as well as other 
 
of their performances or phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers or the producers of 
phonograms concerned or permitted by law.” 
 
27 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 
28 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). 
 
29 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b). 
 
30 17 U.S.C. § 1203. 
 
31 17 U.S.C. § 1204. 
 
32 United States v Elcom Ltd, 203 F Supp 2d 1111, 1120-1121 (2002) (Congress did not ban the act 
of circumventing use restrictions – as compared with access restrictions – because it sought to preserve the 
fair use rights of persons who had lawfully acquired a work). 
 
33 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (emphasis added). 
 
34 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). 
 
35 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(ii), (iii) and (iv) (requiring the Librarian of Congress to take into 
account, amongst other things:  (a) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and 
educational purposes; (b) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures 
applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; 
and, (c) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted 
works.) 
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relevant issues.36 The first set of determinations was published in October, 2003 and 
exempted four classes of works from the access-control prohibitions.37 The limited 
nature of the determination ultimately made could be regarded as somewhat 
disappointing from the perspective of seriously protecting legitimate interests in 
copyright works from restrictive DRM measures bolstered by the DMCA.  Additionally, 
as the following discussion will evidence, the current triennial administrative mechanism 
has many other deficiencies in terms of its ability effectively to protect fair use in 
copyright works. 
 
B.  THE ROLE OF FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Fair use has always been a problematic concept within copyright law.  Although it 
is clearly the most important defense for an action for copyright infringement,38 its 
precise boundaries have never been clear.  This is largely because it is historically an 
equitable defense39 that benefits from flexibility.40 Judicially created, it has now been 
codified in the United States in § 107 of Title 17.  This section does not provide a clear 
definition of what a fair use is, nor how the doctrine operates in practice.  Rather, it 
mentions classes of uses that might typically be thought of as ‘fair use’ in an inclusive, 
rather than an exclusive, manner.41 
36 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v) (in making a determination the Librarian of Congress should 
consider ‘such other factors as the Librarian thinks appropriate). 
37 Library of Congress, Copyright Office; Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright 
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2003/68fr2011.html, last viewed on April 13, 2005 (exempting the 
following classes of works from the access control provisions:  (a) Compilations consisting of lists of 
Internet locations blocked by commercially marketed filtering software applications that are intended to 
prevent access to domains, websites or portions of websites, but not including lists of Internet locations 
blocked by software applications that operate exclusively to protect against damage to a computer or 
computer network or lists of Internet locations blocked by software applications that operate exclusively to 
prevent receipt of e-mail; (b) Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to 
malfunction or damage and which are obsolete; (c) Computer programs and video games distributed in 
formats that have become obsolete and which require the original media or hardware as a condition of 
access. A format shall be considered obsolete if the machine or system necessary to render perceptible a 
work stored in that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the commercial 
marketplace; and, (d) Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook editions of the 
work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access controls that 
prevent the enabling of the ebook's read-aloud function and that prevent the enabling of screen readers to 
render the text into a specialized format.)  
 
38 MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (3ed, 1999), 427. 
 
39 id. 
40 id, 429. 
 
41 The list of fair use purposes set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107 includes: “…purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research…”. 
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Section 107 lists four ‘fair use factors’ that courts can use in determining whether 
a particular use is a fair use.  Again, these factors are not decisive, but are intended to 
allow courts the flexibility to develop the doctrine appropriately in the face of new factual 
circumstances.  The idea of this drafting is to allow the continued development of the fair 
use doctrine in the face of new technologies and new practical circumstances.42 The four 
factors are:  (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyright work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyright work as a whole; and, (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyright work.  
 
Obviously, nothing in § 107 defines clear boundaries for the fair use doctrine.  
This is a matter for incremental judicial determinations.  However, two additional 
questions have come to plague the fair use doctrine in recent years because of the 
challenges posed to copyright law by new digital technologies.  These questions are:  
(a) How should fair use be characterized in terms of its legal basis?  In 
other words, is fair use a legally guaranteed right, a bare  privilege, or a 
mere tolerated inconvenience for the copyright holder?  
(b) How productive/transformative does a use have to be in order to 
qualify as a fair use?  Productive or transformative uses might be 
described as uses that “build on the works of others by adding their 
own socially valuable creative element”.43
Courts and commentators have differed on these questions.44  Although in the past 
they may have seemed somewhat academic, they both become extremely important  in the 
face of digital technologies that can easily restrict access to, and unauthorized uses of, 
copyright works.  The first question is the most important for the purposes of this 
discussion.  If fair use is a legally guaranteed right, technological measures should not be 
employed by copyright holders to the extent that they curtail such rights.  If the only way 
to prevent digital copyright piracy is to employ such measures, it should be incumbent on 
copyright holders to facilitate fair use accesses to, and uses of, their works.  However, if,
on the other hand, fair use is only a tolerated inconvenience, then arguably a copyright 
42 MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (3ed, 1999), 429. 
 
43 id., 430. 
 
44 See, for example, MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (3ed, 1999), 428 
(citing Rosement Enters Inc v Random House Inc, 366 F 2d 303, 306 (2d Cir 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 
1009 (1967) describing fair use as a ‘privilege’); WILLIAM CORNISH and DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (5 ed, 2003) 808 (noting that 
British law has generally assumed that fair dealing exceptions to copyright infringement, the British 
equivalent to fair use, have generally been assumed to be constitutionally guaranteed rights of access and 
use, although there has historically been little actual debate about it); Sony Corporation v Universal City 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (majority and minority judges disagreed over the extent of transformative use 
necessary for finding of fair use). 
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holder has every right to utilize whatever technology and contractual measures45 possible 
to prevent digital piracy, and if fair use is a casualty in this battle, so be it.
It is therefore important in the digital age to answer this question about the nature 
of fair use.  As noted above, this article takes the stance that developments in digital 
technology require fair use to be accepted as a legally guaranteed right capable of 
forming the basis of a legal action to impose a duty on a copyright holder to facilitate a 
relevant use.  Even if fair use has not been characterized in this way in pre-digital 
copyright law, the time has come to elevate its status to combat the imbalances created by 
digital technology, now bolstered by legislation such as the DMCA.
As to the second question about productive/transformative uses, this issue attains 
a great significance in the digital age because of the abundance of personal copying that 
is enabled by such technologies as mp3 file sharing software.  It may seem more 
immediately relevant in situations like the Napster46 and Grokster47 file sharing scenarios 
than in the DRM context.  However, if fair use is to be acknowledged as, or elevated to 
the status of, a legally guaranteed right, it is important to have some idea of its scope.  
These file sharing technologies raise the issue previously considered by the Supreme 
Court in the well known Sony Betamax litigation,48 about the scope of fair use in terms of 
personal copying.  If fair use is a legal right, it will be important for decisions to be made 
as to whether even small scale copying of digital works for personal uses will fall within 
the scope of the concept.  Are these uses sufficiently productive/transformative to be 
regarded as fair uses and, indeed, do they have to be?  
This question does not necessarily need to be answered for the purposes of the 
discussion here about protecting fair use in light of DRM measures restricting access to, 
and use of, copyright works.  However, it is worth noting that an administrative fair use 
facilitation mechanism such as that presented in this article may generate important and 
useful data about emerging social norms relating to fair use, including in the digital file 
sharing context.  This is not to say that everything claimed by potential users of copyright 
works will necessarily be deemed a fair use by an administrative agency or a court.  
However, the procedures advocated here will at least have the potential to generate 
significant volumes of data about what segments of society regard as fair use, and why.  
This will be helpful in future developments in copyright law as new technologies emerge
that may again affect the social bargain with respect to competing interests in copyright 
works.  
45 Most of the discussion in this article focuses on the use of DRM measures to prevent unauthorized 
access to, and use of, digital copyright works.  However, contractual restrictions obviously also have an 
important role to play here and are mentioned throughout the following discussion where appropriate. 
 
46 A&M Records v Napster Inc, 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). 
 
47 MGM Studios v Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (2004), appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
 
48 Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 
THE DRM DILEMMA 
14 
 The administrative procedure advocated here has a significant advantage over 
waiting for legislative and judicial determinations on the questions raised above.  This is 
because a fast and inexpensive administrative procedure can generate more data more 
quickly than typical judicial proceedings or Congressional hearings.  This, in turn, can 
inform future legal developments at the legislative and the judicial level, thus creating an 
evolving system where administrative decisions and data feed into judicial and legislative 
processes, whose determinations ultimately feed back into the administrative procedure.  
This would help to guide administrators in everyday decisions about legitimate uses of 
digital copyright works.  After some years of this system, a much more sophisticated 
picture of socially and economically appropriate norms relating to competing uses of 
digital copyright works could be generated and applied within the legal process.  
The other obvious advantage of the administrative procedure advocated here is 
that it would help to strengthen and preserve legitimate, if unauthorized, uses of copyright 
works outside DRM-protection legislation, such as the DMCA.  Thus, applications of 
DMCA style laws could be more easily limited to digital copyright piracy cases – the area 
in which they were intended to operate – while fair uses could be separately protected 
outside the scope of that legislation.  If fair use was protected in this way, rather than as a 
vague exception or possible defense to a DMCA claim,49 there may be less objection to 
aggressive enforcement of the DMCA in circumstances involving a serious potential for 
digital copyright piracy.  This is because there would be less chance of a successful 
DMCA claim adversely affecting legitimate uses of copyright works by stifling the 
availability of a decryption technology that has both legitimate and illegitimate possible 
uses.  If legitimate uses are preserved under a stand-alone system, such DMCA-based 
incursions into marketing decryption technologies may not matter so much to potential 
legitimate users of an encrypted work.
C.  CRITICISMS OF FAIR USE PROTECTION UNDER THE DMCA
1.  GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
FAIR USE
The DMCA’s anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions have attracted a 
great deal of criticism over the years, notably for their failure to maintain an adequate 
balance of interests in digital copyright works.50  Professor Samuelson has noted that even 
49 It is not currently clear that fair use is, in fact, a defense to a DMCA claim:  Dan Burk, 
Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L REV 1095, 1137-1138 (2003) (DMCA makes no explicit provision 
for fair use with regard to the anticircumvention right itself, as distinct from the copyright in the underlying 
work); Universal City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d 292, 322, 323-324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); aff’d 
273 F 3d 429 (2d Cir 2001) (fair use is not a defense to DMCA infringement); Pamela Samuelson, 
Intellectual Property in the Digital Economy:  Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be 
Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech LJ 519, 539 n. 108 (1999).  But now see also Chamberlain v Skylink, 381 F.3d 
1178, 1200, 1201; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18513, 59, 65 (2004) (suggesting there must be a link between 
fair use and copyright infringement for the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions to apply in a given case). 
50 Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:  Why the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations Need to be Revised, 14(3) BERKELEY TECH L J 519 (1999); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use 
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though the DMCA appears to protect fair use rights by not prohibiting circumventions of 
copy control measures per se,51 the legislation really does little to support fair uses of 
protected works.  This is because most potential fair users do not have the technological 
know-how to access protected works in order to make a fair use of them,52 and because 
there is no provision in the DMCA to permit the distribution of circumvention tools to 
enable fair use.53 The DMCA should perhaps contain an exemption for accessing a 
protected work in order to make a fair use of it.54
More recently, Professor Reese has argued that the distinction between access
prohibitions and use prohibitions under the DMCA makes little sense with respect to 
modern DRM measures.55  He has pointed out that access and copy control measures are 
increasingly merged in practice.56  Thus, a legislative prohibition on unauthorized access
is tantamount to a prohibition on use even if the use in question would otherwise be 
preserved under the legislation.57
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U PA L REV 673 (2000); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to 
Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 NYUL REV 354 
(1999); John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use 
and the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979 (2001) (on concerns that the 
DMCA will over-propertize digital information if courts do not take an adequate stance on protecting ‘fair 
uses’), Tricia J. Sadd , Fair Use as a Defense Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Anti-
Circumvention Prosisions, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 321 (2001); Harry Mihet, iBRIEF: COPYRIGHTS & 
TRADEMARKS: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley: The Constitutional Underpinnings of Fair Use 
Remain an Open Question, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3 (2002).
51 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (prohibits trafficking in a device that can circumvent a copy control 
measure, but not circumvention of a copy control measure per se); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(1)(c) (“Nothing in this 
section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, 
under this title.”); Sameulson, supra note ___, at 539-557. 
 
52 Samuelson, supra note ___, at 551 (“It is unclear whether Congress intended for the 
technologically savvy who could "do it themselves" to be the only ones who could engage in privileged acts 
of circumvention.”) 
 
53 id., at 548 (“section 1201 contains no provision enabling the development or distribution of 
circumvention tools to enable fair use or other privileged uses in terrain which section 1201(a)(1)(A) 
doesn't reach (i.e., making fair uses of lawfully acquired copies)”). 
 
54 There are several bills currently before Congress that attempt to clarify this situation:  Digital 
Choice and Freedom Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003); Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 
2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong (2003).  See infra. 
 
55 R Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of 
Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH LJ 619 (2003). 
56 id., at 621 (“Copyright owners may … be able to employ technological protection systems that 
incorporate both an access control and a rights control. So far, courts have treated such "merged" control 
measures as entitled to the legal protections of both access-and rights-control measures, even when the 
system was essentially directed only at preventing copying and distribution, rather than at controlling 
access. If courts continue to treat merged control measures in this manner, copyright owners may have an 
incentive to use such merged controls in order to maximize their legal protection.”) 
57 id. 
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The DMCA thus clearly has the potential to powerfully enhance the rights of 
copyright holders in digital works.  Indeed, this is the legislative intention.  Governments
around the world have been concerned to promote digital commerce,58 and to prevent 
digital piracy.59  These are difficult tasks to achieve in a borderless digital world.  In 
particular, it is difficult to strike a legislative balance that promotes the interests of 
content holders against the very real threat of digital piracy, without at the same time 
compromising other legitimate interests in digital content, such as fair use.
Outside the nominal attempt to protect fair use interests in digital copyright 
works, the drafting of the DMCA evidences Congressional intent to protect some other 
legitimate interests in digital copyright works.  The legislation contains provisions that 
exempt persons from DMCA liability in situations involving:  (a) non-profit libraries, 
archives, and educational institutions making copies of works for the purposes of 
evaluating their suitability for activities permitted by copyright law;60 (b) law enforcement 
and other government activities;61 (c) reverse engineering;62 (d) encryption research;63 (e) 
protecting personally identifying information;64 and, (f) security testing.65  There are also 
58 United States v Elcom Ltd, 203 F Supp 2d 1111, 1129 (2002). 
 
59 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences:  Five Years Under the DMCA,
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended_consequences.php, last viewed on March 21, 2004 
and on file with the author; Dan Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS 
ANGELES LAW REVIEW 1095, 1135 (2003) (legislative aims behind the drafting of the DMCA were to 
prevent ‘piracy’ in digital works). 
 
60 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d). 
 
61 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e). 
 
62 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).  Reverse engineering has been associated with fair use doctrine prior to the 
enactment of the DMCA, at least in American jurisprudence:  Sega Enterprises v Accolade, Inc, 977 F 2d 
1510 (9th Cir. 1993) (decompilation of a computer program to create a compatible non-infringing program 
is a fair use); Atari Games v Nintendo of Am., 975 F 2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (decompilation to 
produce a non-infringing game would be a fair use, but in this case the program created was ‘substantially 
similar’ to the defendant’s program); LEAFFER, supra note ___, 450-452 (general discussion of reverse 
engineering and fair use in the software context).  However, as demonstrated infra, it is not clear that fair 
use is a defense to a DMCA infringement claim, as distinct from a copyright infringement claim, so the 
‘reverse engineering’ defense under the DMCA potentially has some real work to do on the face of the 
legislation as currently drafted:  Dan Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L REV 1095, 1137-1138 
(2003) (DMCA makes no explicit provision for fair use with regard to the anticircumvention right itself, as 
distinct from the copyright in the underlying work); Universal City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 
2d 292, 322, 323-324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); aff’d 273 F 3d 429 (2d Cir 2001) (fair use is not a defense to 
DMCA infringement). 
 
63 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g). 
 
64 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i). 
 
65 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j). 
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the limitations on the access-control circumvention prohibition set out in the Librarian of 
Congress’ triennial review of the operation of § 1201(a)(1) noted supra.66
Some of the activities protected here may overlap with fair use: for example, 
reverse engineering has been held to constitute a fair use in a number of copyright cases.67
Most of the specific DMCA defenses are, as yet, judicially untested.  There have been 
some concerns about their likely efficacy in practice.68  However, regardless of their 
efficacy, the list of protected purposes does give some indication as to what Congress felt 
were legitimate uses of a copyright work in the digital age.  
Despite the express intentions of the drafters of the DMCA to preserve such 
legitimate interests in accessing and using otherwise protected works, the legislation has 
been judicially interpreted in a manner that chills innovation and stifles certain legitimate 
interests in copyright works.  The best way to illustrate the tensions currently arising in 
American law in relation to the balance of rights and interests in digital content is to 
examine some of the case law interpreting the DRM-related provisions of the DMCA.  
The focus is on some of the more ‘straightforward’ applications of the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions in cases involving obvious use of a DRM 
measure to prevent unauthorized access to, and use of, a digitally stored copyright work.  
In particular, these cases illustrate the attitude courts have taken to the preservation of fair 
use rights under the DMCA.  
These cases, along with the drafting of the DMCA, have not gone without their 
critics.  Most of the criticism has been directed at the overly restrictive approach taken to 
the protection of digital content within the United States .  In this article, the argument is 
made that an overly restrictive attitude of this kind reflected in American legislation and 
jurisprudence can have wider ranging implications than just on the domestic copyright 
scene.  Because we live in an increasingly globalized society, and the United States is 
often a first mover on issues such as the protection of digital content, American courts 
and legislatures need to be aware of the effect of their determinations in a broader global 
context.  This is not necessarily a bad thing, and the United States certainly should not be 
blamed for bad policies voluntarily adopted by other nations.  However, it is all the more 
66 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(B) - (D). 
 
67 Reverse engineering has been associated with fair use doctrine prior to the enactment of the 
DMCA, at least in American jurisprudence:  Sega Enterprises v Accolade, Inc, 977 F 2d 1510 (9th Cir. 
1993) (decompilation of a computer program to create a compatible non-infringing program is a fair use); 
Atari Games v Nintendo of Am., 975 F 2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (decompilation to produce a non-
infringing game would be a fair use, but in this case the program created was ‘substantially similar’ to the 
defendant’s program); LEAFFER, supra note ___, 450-452 (general discussion of reverse engineering and 
fair use in the software context). 
 
68 Dan Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L REV 1095, 1139 (2003) (suggesting that the § 
1201(f) exemption to anticircumvention liability only applies to the creation of interoperable software and 
does not extend to reverse engineering hardware or data; presumably this implies that the exemption will 
not save reverse engineering undertaken for the purpose of creating an interoperable tangible good that 
incidentally incorporates the software in question).
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reason for Congress and American courts to reflect carefully on the potential long term 
effects of their actions both on a national level and ultimately also on a global scale.
a.  Universal City Studios v Reimerdes
The first significant judicial interpretation of the DMCA’s anti-trafficking 
provisions was the case of Universal City Studios v Reimerdes.69  The major American 
motion picture studios had begun to market movies in DVD format.  They were 
concerned about the ease with which this digital content could be cheaply, quickly, and 
near-perfectly copied by digital pirates.  They thus employed a DRM measure called 
‘CSS’ code (short for ‘Content Scrambling System’) to encrypt DVDs and protect them 
against unauthorized copying.  CSS code can also be used to regionally encode digital 
works such as movies in DVD formats and digital video game cartridges, a fact that has 
some significance in the Australian case of Sony v Stevens70 –infra.
Prior to the Reimerdes litigation, the movie studios had made agreements with 
manufacturers of DVD players for those manufacturers to incorporate software code into 
DVD players that would enable them to decrypt the CSS code and play a protected DVD.  
However, the decryption software would not allow copying of DVD content, only
playing a DVD.  Shortly after releasing DVDs into the market, a decryption algorithm for 
the CSS code was invented by a Norwegian teenager as part of a high school science 
project.  The decryption code was called ‘DeCSS’.  Eventually, the DeCSS code made its 
way to the United States via the Internet, and became widely available to those who 
wished to be able to decrypt, and therefore copy, DVDs marketed by motion picture 
studios in the United States.
The movie studios were obviously concerned about the impact this would have on 
their ability to profit from marketing DVDs.  They were unable to take direct action 
against the student in Norway who invented DeCSS because he was not within the 
jurisdiction of the United States and, in any event, the decryption activities he engaged in 
took place before the effective date of the DMCA.71  It was also unwieldy for the motion 
69 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d Universal City Studios v Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd 
Cir. 2001). 
 
70 [2002] FCA 906 (26 July 2002), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/2002/906.html?query=eddy+stevens, last viewed on July 14, 2004.  
This decision was overturned in part on appeal to the full federal court:  see Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 (30 July 2003), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2003/157.html, last viewed on July 14, 2004. 
 
71 However, the Motion Picture Associate of America (“MPAA”) later apparently brought pressure 
to bear on Norwegian authorities to prosecute Jan Johansen who decrypted CSS under Norwegian criminal 
law upon attaining the age of majority in Norway.  He was eventually acquitted of all criminal charges.  See 
discussion in Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Norwegian Teenager Jon Johansen Acquitted in DVD Case:  
Legal to Descramble his DVDs on Linux Computer in Norway”, available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/DeCSS_prosecutions/Johansen_DeCSS_case/20030107_eff_pr.html, last 
viewed on July 23, 2004.  This is direct evidence of the impact United States digital copyright policy can 
have on the international scale.  
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picture studios to attempt to proceed against individuals who may have downloaded the 
DeCSS code from the Internet and used it to decrypt and copy DVDs.  It would be 
difficult to identify such prospective defendants, and to gather necessary evidence against 
each of them individually.  In any event, it may have been assumed that much of the 
individual private copying of DVDs could be justified under the fair use doctrine.
Thus, the studios proceeded against the operators of a computer hackers’ website 
that both posted the DeCSS code and encouraged others to download and use it, as well 
as providing links to other websites that contained copies of the DeCSS code for 
download.  The case proceeded on the basis that the operators of the website had 
trafficked in a device (the DeCSS code) that had no significant purpose other than to 
circumvent a copy-protection measure.  The movie studios were successful in obtaining 
injunctions against the operators of the hackers’ website containing the DeCSS code.  
The injunctions prevented the website operators from including the code on their website.  
It also required them to remove hyperlinks to other websites where the DeCSS code was 
available for download.  
The defendants raised arguments based on the First Amendment to the effect that 
software code (such as the DeCSS code) is protected speech, and any legislation 
impeding the dissemination of this code is an unjustified restriction on speech.  They also 
argued that the fair use doctrine from copyright law is a constitutionally protected right 
based on the First Amendment.  They were unsuccessful on both counts.  The court, both 
at first instance and on appeal, held that although software code does have an expressive 
component that may be protected as First Amendment speech,72 the DMCA satisfied the 
‘intermediate scrutiny’ test developed for content-neutral regulation of such expression.73
Further, and more importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the appeal court noted 
that the Supreme Court has never held that the fair use doctrine is constitutionally 
guaranteed, even though previous cases have referred to it as being part of the balance 
between copyright law and free speech.74
In respect of fair use, the court also made the point that the defendants could not, 
in any event, avail themselves of the defense because they were not engaging in fair uses 
of copyright works, even if their conduct involved in part the dissemination of 
circumvention tools to enable others to make fair use of works.  The court noted that the 
express legislative preservation of the fair use defense in the DMCA75 said nothing about 
72 Universal City Studios v Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 447 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“Computer programs are not 
exempted from the category of First Amendment speech simply because their instructions require use of a 
computer. A recipe is no less "speech" because it calls for the use of an oven, and a musical score is no less 
"speech" because it specifies performance on an electric guitar”). 
73 id., at 455 (“a content-neutral regulation need not employ the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing the governmental objective …. It need only avoid burdening "substantially more speech than 
is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests””); 459-460 (affirming lower court judgment, 
including injunctions on dissemination via linking of DeCSS code). 
 
74 id., at 458 (“the Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required, although 
some isolated statements in its opinions might arguably be enlisted for such a requirement.”) 
 
75 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1). 
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rights to circumvent a digital lock, or to traffic in a device that could circumvent a digital 
lock for the purposes of making a fair use.  In this context, the appeal court noted that § 
1201(c)(1):  “simply clarifies that the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls 
guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention tools), but does not 
concern itself with the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred.” 76  In 
other words, the DMCA should be read to ensure that fair uses of a copyright work are 
not prohibited just because the information was originally obtained in a manner made 
illegal by the DMCA.77
Judge Kaplan at first instance had responded to the suggestion that he should not 
grant an injunction because it would be like ‘locking the barn door after the horse has 
bolted’. 78  He took the view that to conclude that an injunction should not be granted on 
this basis would effectively:  “create all the wrong incentives by allowing defendants to 
continue violating the DMCA simply because others, many doubtless at defendants’ 
urging, are doing so as well.”79 This would create incentives for defendants to:  “ensure 
that others engage in the same unlawful conduct in order to set up the argument that an 
injunction against defendants would be futile because everyone else is doing the same 
thing.”80 While acknowledging that equity should not act to grant a remedy where a 
controversy has become moot,81 Judge Kaplan was apparently more troubled that a 
defendant could possibly destroy a valuable intellectual property right by posting 
circumvention measures on the Internet.82 
In fact, more recent events suggest that this question itself may be moot.  The 
movie studios, and other digital content industries, have continued relentlessly enforcing 
their rights under the DMCA as well as copyright law more generally in the digital age, 
regardless of the impact this might have on fair use.  Two more recent cases on the 
DMCA, one involving criminal sanctions against a foreign corporation, arose in the wake 
of the Reimerdes litigation.  Further, the music industry has continued to litigate against 
76 Universal City Studios v Corley, 273 F.3d 429, at headnote 5 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
 
77 id.
78 United City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 
79 id. 
80 id. 
81 id. 
82 id. 
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online services that allow digital music filing sharing,83 and has increasingly threatened 
individual file sharers with legal action.84
None of this is to say that digital content industries do not have every legal right 
to protect their copyright works in the online world.  However, these developments do 
show that concerns about the ineffectuality of injunctions under laws like the DMCA are 
now moot.  The digital content industries appear to be more than adequately able to use 
even the threat of litigation, based on some powerful judicial precedents, against those 
who would impinge on their actual or perceived rights.  In spite of this, little legislative or 
judicial thought has been given to methods for more effectively protecting legitimate 
interests in digital copyright works that have not been expressly authorized by a copyright 
holder.
b.  United States v ElcomSoft Ltd
The Reimerdes decision was followed by two federal court decisions involving 
similar factual situations.  Each of the following cases came up with similar results to the 
Reimerdes courts.  One of the cases involved the motion picture industry for a second 
time, and the other involved Adobe’s digital eBook format.  The eBook case was decided 
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose 
Division in 2002.  It followed an unusual series of events involving the Adobe eBook 
formatting software, and the activities of a Russian Corporation, Elcom Ltd, and one of 
its employee computer programmers, Dmitri Sklyarov.  Sklyarov and Elcom were the 
first software developers to be prosecuted under the criminal provisions of the DMCA.85 
This is a good example of the direct impact that domestic copyright anti-piracy laws can 
have in the international arena.  Neither the initial defendant (Sklyarov), nor the ultimate 
defendant (Elcom), were present in the United States when the conduct in question 
occurred.  However, the powerful DMCA sanctions were able to reach out to the Russian 
defendant and his employer, partly because of a chance visit by Sklyarov to the United 
States to attend an information technology conference. 
 
The eBook format under consideration in this case was able to be used by online 
book publishers and distributors to limit the uses a purchaser could make of an eBook:  
for example, the format could be set for a purchaser to read the book on one computer, 
but not to copy it to another computer, or perhaps to read the book on a computer screen, 
but not to be able to print it out in hard copy.  Elcom and Sklyarov developed software 
that could disable these restrictive features of Adobe’s proprietary eBook format.  Their 
 
83 See, for example MGM Studios v Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (2004), appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 
84 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, “File Sharing:  It’s Music to Our Ears”, available at 
http://www.eff.org/share/, last viewed on 23 July 2004 (links to status of actions brought my music industry 
in the United States against consumers online) 
 
85 See discussion at Electronic Frontier Foundation, “US v. ElcomSoft & Sklyarov FAQ”, available 
at:  http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US_v_Elcomsoft/us_v_sklyarov_faq.html#ChargedWith, last viewed on 
July 14, 2004. 
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software would enable activities not authorized by the original publisher/distributor of an 
eBbook.  The product developed by Elcom was called the Advanced eBook Processor 
(“AEBPR”).   
 
The ability to use AEBPR to convert a restricted eBook file into a standard .pdf 
file capable of being copied and printed could enable purchasers of eBooks to engage in 
fair uses of legitimately purchased eBooks without infringing standard copyright law.  It 
was assumed in the litigation that fair use allows a purchaser of an eBook to read an 
eBook on a different computer to the one it was originally downloaded on, to make a 
back-up copy of the eBook, or to print a hard copy of an eBook.86 However, AEBPR 
could also allow a user to engage in a copyright infringement by making and distributing 
unlawful copies of an eBook.87 
The course of events leading to the ultimate decision in United States of America 
v Elcom Ltd88 commenced with the arrest of Sklyarov when he attended a computer 
science conference in Las Vegas in 2001.  He was detained by American authorities 
between July 16 and December 13 of 2001.  He was charged with five counts of violating 
American law, including four counts alleging circumvention offenses and aiding and 
abetting circumvention offenses, under the DMCA, along with a charge of conspiracy to 
traffic in a circumvention program. He faced up to 25 years in prison and a fine of up to 
$2,250,000.  His employer, Elcom, faced a penalty of $2,500,000.  He was eventually 
released from custody and allowed to return to Russia as part of an agreement that he 
would testify in the criminal case against his employer, and that criminal charges against 
him personally would ultimately be dropped.89 
In the ensuing litigation, Elcom was found guilty with respect to all the charges 
against it.  Similar arguments were raised by the defense as in the Reimerdes case, 
including arguments that the DMCA was constitutionally invalid under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the decryption technology in 
question (AEBPR) was able to be used by purchasers for fair use purposes which were 
protected by the First Amendment.  These arguments were rejected for similar reasons to 
those upheld in Reimerdes. Elcom was ultimately acquitted by a jury on the basis that it 
did not mean to violate the law.90 However, its AEBPR product was held to be illegal. 
 
86 See United States v Elcom, 203 F Supp 2d 1111, 1118-1119 (2002). 
 
87 id., 1119. 
 
88 203 F Supp 2d 1111 (2002). 
 
89 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, “US v. ElcomSoft & Sklyarov FAQ”, available at: 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US_v_Elcomsoft/us_v_sklyarov_faq.html#Status, last viewed on July 14, 
2004. 
 
90 Bowman, ElcomSoft Verdict:  Not Guilty, available at:  http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
978176.html, last viewed on July 14, 2004.  Interestingly, the defense in the Elcom case ran the argument 
that the DMCA was unconstitutional for being too vague in terms of what conduct was deemed to be 
illegal.  This argument was also unsuccessful. 
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The court made some telling observations about the DMCA and fair use that go to 
the heart of the argument made here in favor of an administrative mechanism to facilitate 
fair uses of protected copyright works in the face of digital anti-piracy legislation.  In 
particular, with respect to the argument that the DMCA adversely impacted on fair use 
rights, the court noted:  “[W]ith regard to the argument that fair use rights are impaired 
[by the DMCA], the DMCA does not eliminate fair use or substantially impair the fair 
use rights of anyone.  Congress has not banned or eliminated fair use and nothing in the 
DMCA prevents anyone from quoting from a work or comparing texts for the purpose of 
study or criticism.  The fair user may find it more difficult to engage in certain fair uses 
with regard to electronic books, but nevertheless, fair use is still available.”91 
The court here expressly accepts that digital technology does have an impact on 
fair use in that it may now be practically more difficult for a potential fair user to exercise 
her fair use right or privilege in the face of DRM measures applied to a work.  
Additionally, the court implicitly suggests that the DMCA is effectively neutral on this 
point.  In other words, the DMCA neither hinders nor assists the fair user.  However, this 
point is debatable.  A law that bolsters the ability of a copyright holder to utilize 
restrictive DRM measures to disable access to, and particular uses of, a copyright work 
might arguably be described as a law that does adversely impact on fair use.  Even if the 
DMCA does not ‘ban or eliminate’ fair use as the court suggests, it seems to have a 
significant impact here. 
 
It could be argued that the Reimerdes and Elcom courts were incorrect not to read 
more significance into § 1201(c)(1) of the DMCA – the section that expressly preserves 
fair use in the face of the new anti-circumvention provisions.  There have certainly been 
recent efforts to clarify this issue through new legislation that would guarantee the right 
of a user of a work to circumvent a DRM measure, or even to be involved in trafficking 
in a circumvention device, to make a fair use of a copyright work.92 Both the Digital 
Choice and Freedom Bill93 (‘DCFA’) and the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Bill 
(‘DMCRA’),94 if enacted by Congress, would allow circumvention and trafficking in a 
circumvention device where the resulting circumvention was excused by the fair use 
defense, among other things.95 
91 United States v Elcom, 203 F Supp 2d 1111, 1134-1135 (2002). 
 
92 See following discussion for similar initiatives under recent amendments to the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act (Eng.), 1988. 
 
93 Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003). 
94 Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong (2003). 
95 Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.,§ 5(b) (2003) (allowing 
circumvention of a technological protection measure if it does not result in a copyright infringement); 
Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong., § 5 (2003) (allowing circumvention 
and/or trafficking in a circumvention device for purposes of making a non-infringing use of a copyright 
work in certain circumstances). 
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Like the suggestions made in this article for better supporting fair uses of digital 
copyright works through an administrative complaints procedure, the scheme of both the 
DCFA and the DMCRA in this respect appears to elevate fair use into a constitutionally 
guaranteed right, or to implicitly accept that fair use has always had that character.  
However, a significant problem with these legislative initiatives is that they do not 
impose any affirmative duties on copyright holders to facilitate access to, and use of, 
protected copyright works for fair use purposes.  Again, they rely on the availability of 
circumvention devices for those who wish to make fair uses of copyright works.  If 
litigation continues along the Reimerdes and Elcom path, such devices may well not be 
available to potentially legitimate users of copyright works.  
 
It seems that the balance between the proprietary rights of digital content holders 
and those with competing interests in proprietary information is currently becoming 
eroded.  Courts, in their efforts to uphold Congress’ intention to prevent digital piracy, 
are increasingly opting to promote only the most difficult and old-fashioned methods of 
copying in order for an individual to make fair use of a work.96 Additionally, courts have 
not found that there is any obligation on a right-holder to make any copyright work 
accessible in the first place in order for a fair use to be made of it.  In other words, most 
of the judicial discourse to date in the United States has focused on use, rather than 
access, despite the fact that DRM measures prohibiting access and use are often merged 
in practice.97 This may be a valid judicial approach given the current drafting of the 
DMCA.  However, this being the case, it may be time for a new approach.98 A number of 
different options might work here, and many have already been tried in the United States, 
including the triennial review of the operation of the DMCA by the Librarian of 
Congress.  However, for reasons described below, a simple and inexpensive 
administrative complaints procedure tailored towards protecting individual fair use 
interests in copyright works, supported by appropriate legislation, may be a more useful 
solution. 
 
c.  321 Studios v MGM Studios
The case of 321 Studios v MGM Studios99 does not add a significant amount to the 
previous discussion of the fate of the fair use doctrine in the face of DRM technologies 
bolstered by the DMCA.  However, it is a more recent case than the previous cases and 
 
96 For example, transcribing a passage of an eBook by hand, rather than making a digital copy, in the 
absence of access to digital decryption technology that would allow electronic ‘cutting and pasting’ for fair 
use purposes. 
 
97 R Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of 
Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH LJ 619, 621 (2003). 
98 id., at 657-665 (suggesting some possible legislative approaches to the current problems of merged 
access and control measures). 
 
99 307 F Supp 2d 1085 (2004). 
 
THE DRM DILEMMA 
25 
shows that the worrying trend of losing focus on fair use in the battle against digital 
copyright piracy is continuing along the same lines.  This case, like Reimerdes, involved 
a defendant trafficking in DVD circumvention software with respect to the CSS code 
employed by the motion picture industry in marketing its DVDs.  The defense raised 
similar arguments to those raised in Reimerdes and Elcom and was similarly 
unsuccessful.  The Court unsurprisingly held that creating and marketing products that 
enable fair use of a digital copyright work will infringe the DMCA if they can be used to 
circumvent a DRM measure.  The court noted that there is no clear authority that fair use 
is a constitutionally guaranteed right.100 In any event, fair use is not a defense to a 
DMCA infringement claim.   
 
The main factual point of distinction between this case and Reimerdes is that 321 
Studios marketed and sold software products for copying DVDs with a particular 
emphasis on purchasers making fair uses of legitimately purchased DVDs with their 
software, including enabling back-up copies to be made.  321 Studios sought declaratory 
relief in part on the basis that their software had substantial non-infringing uses.  
However, this argument met the same fate as similar arguments in Elcom and Reimerdes.
The court again took the view that the DMCA does not restrict fair use, and that 
prohibiting trafficking in circumvention technologies does not impinge on the ability to 
make fair use of a copyright work.   
 
The court in 321 Studios made some reference to the difficulty of increasingly 
‘merged’ access and copy control measures, accepting that some DRM measures 
effectively control access and thus do technically restrict a potential fair user’s ability to 
access a copyright work in order to make a fair use of it.101 However, the court noted 
that, on the facts in 321 Studios at least, the purpose of the access control employed by 
the movie studio plaintiffs was to prevent copying even though it incidentally prevented 
access. Thus, it was validly protected by § 1201(b)(1) of the DMCA.  Again, this is an 
example of how the technical merger of access and copy control measures leads to 
situations where applying the DMCA as currently drafted impinges in an undesirable way 
on fair use in copyright law.   
 
Some of the most obvious points of concern about the DMCA and judicial 
determinations involving its anti-trafficking provisions relate to the balance between 
protection of proprietary interests in digital copyright works and other legitimate interests 
in digital copyright works.  The fate of the fair use doctrine in these determinations is 
particularly noteworthy, including the fact that it has not generally been regarded as a 
legally guaranteed right by courts interpreting the DMCA.  Additionally, confusions 
about the distinction between DRM measures on access and use of digital copyright 
works appear to be leaving some potential fair users out in the cold.  Although there is 
technically no ban on fair use under the DMCA, as the Elcom and 321 Studios courts take 
 
100 id., 1101. 
 
101 See discussion in R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls 
Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law? 16 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 619 
(2004). 
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pains to point out, there is no assistance provided for potential fair users who cannot 
access a work as a result of a DRM measure.  There is certainly no provision in the 
DMCA as currently drafted that copyright holders must facilitate access to digitally 
encrypted works for people who wish to make fair uses of those works.   
 
This is an area where the legal systems in the United States and other jurisdictions 
need to start being more proactive if an appropriate balance of interests is to be struck 
with respect to the access and use of digital copyright works.  Some legislative initiatives 
have commenced in this direction, most notably the current triennial review of the 
DMCA by the Librarian of Congress, and the proposed DCFA and DMCRA measures 
described supra.  Other countries are experimenting with different approaches to 
facilitating fair use of digitally encrypted works.  The United Kingdom has recently 
adopted an interesting variation on the idea of an administrative complaints procedure to 
promote fair uses of such works – see infra.
How successful these initiatives ultimately become in practice remains to be seen.  
The new British regulations remain untested and may prove costly and unwieldy to 
implement.102 Obviously, laws in the digital copyright area should be aimed at 
encouraging, rather than stifling, innovation.  Laws that effectively prohibit all 
unauthorized access, and therefore use, of digital copyright works will miss the mark here 
because of their potential to damage society and innovation.  However, it has been 
difficult to see what the alternatives could be, particularly with the digital content 
industries so focused on regulating technologies that could be used to injure their 
copyright interests.  Thus, the answer may be to take the protection of fair use interests 
away from attempts to prevent digital copyright piracy, and to preserve fair use in other 
ways, rather than as legislative ‘carve-outs’ to the operation of anti-circumvention 
technology laws.  An administrative approach such as that suggested in this article might 
provide a more sophisticated and nuanced solution to the DRM dilemma that meets the 
overall needs of the digital information society in terms of balancing competing interests 
in digital copyright works, while at the same time leaving undisturbed the existing digital 
copyright anti-piracy laws. 
2.  CRITIQUE OF THE TRIENNIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW MECHANISM
Before turning in more detail to some of the alternative approaches to protecting 
legitimate uses of copyright works in the face of DRM technology and anti-piracy 
legislation, it is worth briefly critiquing the triennial review procedure in the DMCA.  As 
noted supra, the triennial review is intended to exempt certain classes of copyright works 
from the operation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA as they relate to 
individual access to a protected work.103  In other words, the relevant provisions do not 
exempt any activities related to circumventing a copy control measure applied to a 
102 See infra.
103 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(D). 
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copyright work, nor do they exempt trafficking in any anti-circumvention devices, 
whether those devices circumvent access or copy control measures, or both.
The triennial review, while useful in its own way, is not a sufficient measure to 
fully address the DRM dilemma identified in this article.  The review does not effectively 
facilitate fair use of digitally encrypted copyright works in a manner appropriate to the 
needs of the digital information society.  As with the above criticisms of the DCFA and 
the DMCRA draft legislation, there are no affirmative duties placed on copyright holders 
under the triennial review mechanism to facilitate fair use.  Although certain individuals 
could argue, in light of a determination by the Librarian of Congress, that the DMCA’s 
anti- circumvention provisions do not apply to their accessing a given work, such an 
individual is given no additional legal support to require that a copyright holder make 
access available.  Assuming that the copyright holder is not prepared to make access 
available, the potential fair user may not personally have the technological sophistication 
to circumvent a relevant access-control measure herself.  She may further not be able to 
gain the technological means to circumvent the access-control measure because the anti-
trafficking provisions still apply in full force to effectively restrict the availability of
devices that can circumvent both access-control and copy-control measures.
Further, the triennial review procedure does not deal with exemptions from copy-
control technology.  Thus, to the extent that an access-control measure is not merged with 
a copy-control measure applied to a particular work, the ability of an individual to gain 
access to the work by circumventing the access-control measure does not assist the 
individual in making a copy for fair use purposes.  Such purposes may include creating a 
limited number of copies for classroom use or for distribution to members of a research 
team.
The triennial review mechanism is also not particularly timely in responding to 
concerns of potential fair users in the digital information society.  Despite the 
exponentially fast pace of technological developments in digital content areas, the review 
is only conducted every three years, and the Librarian of Congress, at least to date, seems 
to be taking a fairly conservative stance on the number and type of exemptions ordered in 
any given review period.104  In addition, the recommendations made are not specifically 
tailored to individual fair user’s needs, but focus instead on classes of works that should 
be exempted from DMCA protection.  By definition, this will tend to make the 
determinations much narrower than they might be if the Librarian of Congress was asked 
to focus on uses of protected works more generally, rather than on potential uses of 
specific classes of works.
If the administrative determinations are drafted in terms of classes of works, rather 
than classes of uses more generally regardless of the class of work involved, the 
104 Only four minor exemptions were made in the initial 2003 review of the operation of the anti-
circumvention provisions, despite the fact that representations were made to the Registrar of Copyrights 
and the Librarian of Congress in relation to a number of other classes of works:  see Library of Congress, 
Copyright Office; Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2003/68fr2011.html, last viewed on 
April 13, 2005. 
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administrative decision-makers are much more likely to defer to copyright interests.  This 
is because, faced with the choice of exempting an entire class of works from anti- access 
protection, the Librarian of Congress is much more likely to protect the property rights 
holder by limiting orders to more obscure or obsolete works105 so as not to discourage 
innovations in the copyright area.  If a potentially expansive, new, or innovative class of 
works were targeted for exemption by public interest groups, this would likely be 
regarded by the Librarian of Congress as having extremely damaging consequences in a 
relevant copyright industry.  Thus, the Librarian would be unlikely to ultimately make a 
determination exempting that class of works from the provisions of § 1201(a)(1)(A).
The administrative complaints procedure advocated in this article, on the other 
hand, focuses on protecting individual uses of copyright works regardless of the type of 
work.  This has the potential to be better tailored to the specific needs of individuals in 
society.  It is a more sophisticated and nuanced approach than the triennial review 
mechanism, even though it does place additional burdens on copyright holders that are 
not imposed under the current administrative mechanism.  As noted supra, given the 
current tilting of the balance of copyright interests in favor of the rights-holders and away 
from those who would traditionally be able to access and use relevant works for fair use 
purposes, this may, in fact, be a desirable development.  Further, the additional burdens 
placed on copyright holders are unlikely to be particularly onerous or unwieldy in 
practice given the actual nature of the obligations and the fact that copyright holders 
currently hold the technological know-how to make access of works available to certain 
people for particular stated purposes without going to any great efforts in terms of time
and cost.  This argument is taken up in more detail infra.
II.   RE-ALIGNING COMPETING INTERESTS IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT WORKS:
THE GLOBAL DIMENSION 
A.  DRM LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA
1.  THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION
The DRM dilemma is not peculiar to the United States.  Although the federal 
Congress was the first legislature to enact DRM-supporting legislation in the guise of the 
DMCA, other countries soon followed suit.  As each relevant country has enacted a new 
iteration of DRM-supporting legislation, more thought appears to have been given to the 
place of fair use in the digital copyright arena.  The Australian and British legislation 
enacted in 2000 and 2003 respectively are good examples of this iterative development.  
The main problem with the approaches that have been developed so far is that none of 
them seems sufficiently nuanced to effectively deal with the DRM dilemma without 
imposing significant burdens on potential fair users.  This is why a new approach is 
suggested here.  If the United States were to adopt such an approach, it could be a world 
leader in redressing the balance of interests in digital copyright works.  Further, it could 
 
105 This is arguably what happened in the initial 2003 review.  See id. 
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prevent being relegated to following the lead of an approach developed in another 
country that may be looking at the issue more closely than is currently the case in the 
United States.106 
Fairly soon after the enactment of the DMCA in the United States, the Australian 
federal parliament enacted the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act.  This 
legislation came into effect in September of 2000.  Amongst other things, it inserted a 
new § 116A into the Australian copyright act of 1968.  The new section is drafted 
somewhat differently to the DMCA, but is intended to achieve similar results.  Section 
116A(1) sets out the prohibited conduct in terms related to making, trading in, 
distributing, exhibiting, or importing a device that can circumvent a technological 
protection measure attached to a copyright work.107 Section 116A(1)(c) includes a 
requirement that the defendant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the device 
in question would be used to circumvent, or facilitate the circumvention of a 
technological protection measure. 
 
Exemptions from liability include:  (a) activities lawfully done for the purposes of 
law enforcement or national security;108 (b) supply of a circumvention device to a person 
for use for a ‘permitted purpose’;109 and, (c) making or importing of a circumvention 
device solely for a permitted purpose.110 ‘Permitted purpose’ is not defined in the 
legislation, although § 116A(3)(b)(v) contemplates that for the purposes of giving 
statutory notice to a supplier of a circumvention device the permitted purpose in question 
must be identified by reference to certain delineated sections of the copyright act.111 
106 This has certainly been a matter of concern in the United States with respect to sui generis 
database protection legislation.  The United States did not act on this issue before the European Union 
Member States implemented the provisions of the E.U. Database Directive.  This means that the United 
States now has to deal with the growing body of law on database protection in the European Union in 
formulating its own future proposals in the area because of the global reach of the issue.  For a discussion 
of the relationship between the European Union approaches to database protection and some of the previous 
discussions in the United States, see Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Property Rights and Public Polibices:  
Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 773 (2003). 
 
107 ‘Technological protection measure’ is defined in § 10 as comprising an access control measure, a 
copy control measure or both. 
 
108 Copyright Act (Australia), 1968, § 116A(2). 
 
109 id., § 116A(3). 
 
110 id., § 116A(4). 
 
111 id., §§ 47D, 47E, 47F, 48A, 49, 50, 51A, 183 and Part VB.  None of these sections deals with 
traditional fair uses of a copyright work.  Those uses are covered (as ‘fair dealing’ exemptions to copyright 
infringement) under sections 40 to 42 of the Copyright Act. 
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These sections do not include the general ‘fair dealing’112 sections that are found in the 
copyright legislation.113 
They do include sections that mirror some of the exemptions found in the DMCA: 
for example, reverse engineering computer software to create interoperable products,114 
to fix errors,115 and for security testing purposes,116 as well as certain uses of material for 
governmental purposes,117 and certain uses by libraries and archives.118 Thus, like the 
DMCA, there appears to be no general fair use exemption contemplated to the operation 
of the prohibitions on circumventing technological protection measures and/or trafficking 
in devices that facilitate such circumventions.   However, there are some legitimate or 
‘permitted’ purposes that, in some ways, resemble things that have been considered to be 
aligned with fair use doctrine in the past.119 
The exemptions to § 116A liability are limited in their operation.  The exemption 
for supplying a circumvention device to a person for a permitted purpose requires that the 
person to whom the circumvention device or service is supplied be a ‘qualified’ 
person.120 Additionally, the person must give the supplier a signed declaration stating her 
name and address,121 the basis on which she is a qualified person,122 the name and address 
of the supplier of the circumvention device,123 that the device in question is to be used 
only for a permitted purpose by a qualified person,124 identifying the permitted purpose 
by reference to one of the relevant sections of the copyright act,125 and, stating that the 
 
112 ‘Fair dealing’ is the Australian equivalent terminology to the American ‘fair use’ concept.  The 
‘fair dealing’ terminology is also employed in British copyright law. 
 
113 §§ 40-42 of the Copyright Act, 1968 (Aust.). 
 
114 § 47D. 
 
115 § 47E. 
 
116 § 47F. 
 
117 § 48A. 
 
118 §§ 50, 51. 
 
119 Such as reverse engineering of software – see note ___ supra.
120 § 116A(3)(a).  ‘Qualified person’ is defined in § 116A(8) with reference to statutory permissions 
to make interoperable products, to engage in security testing and / or to correct errors in a digital work, or 
who has authority to make a permitted use of a work from various listed government departments. 
 
121 § 116A(3)(b)(i). 
 
122 § 116A(3)(b)(ii). 
 
123 § 116A(3)(b)(iii). 
 
124 § 116A(3)(b)(iv). 
 
125 § 116A(3)(b)(v). 
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work in question is not readily available in a form that is not protected by a technological 
protection measure.126 
These requirements may be difficult to fulfil in some circumstances.  If, for 
example, a circumvention device is downloaded from a website, there may be no way to 
identify the supplier and her contact details for the purpose of sending the statutory 
notice.  Of course, this may be what the legislature had in mind.  The idea is presumably 
to encourage people who wish to circumvent a DRM measure for a permitted purpose 
only to obtain a circumvention device from a reputable supplier who can be easily 
identified and contacted in the case of a dispute about the device or circumvention 
activities conducted using the device.   
 
Additionally, it may be difficult for a person to ascertain whether or not the work 
in question is readily available in a form that is not protected by a technological 
protection measure.  There is no guidance in the legislation as to how much effort a 
person would be required to go to in order to ascertain that the work is not otherwise 
readily available: for example, would a 20 minute Internet search and a few phone calls 
suffice here?  How does a defendant satisfy this test?  What evidence needs to be adduced 
to show that the material was not otherwise readily available to the defendant?  Overall, 
like the DMCA, additional burdens are imposed here on people seeking to make fair uses 
of a copyright work.  Given the imbalance of resources between digital content owners 
and people likely to want to make legitimate uses of a digital work (researchers, 
educators etc), it would seem that perhaps a more appropriate balance would involve 
placing greater burdens on a copyright holder to facilitate the exercise of these kinds of 
interests.127 
In relation to the exemption for making or importing a circumvention device 
solely for a permitted purpose, this may at first glance appear to be an improvement on 
the DMCA in that it allows making or importing of circumvention devices in certain 
circumstances.  However, on a closer reading, it may operate as restrictively as the 
DMCA in practice.  The DMCA prohibits trafficking in a circumvention device: (a) that 
is primarily designed to circumvent an access or copy control measure;128 (b) that has 
only limited commercially significant use or purpose other than to circumvent an access 
or copy control measure;129 or, (c) that is marketed specifically for the purpose of 
circumventing an access or copy control measure.130 
126 § 116A(3)(b)(vi). 
 
127 See, for example, approach taken under § 296ZE of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988 
(Eng.) in the United Kingdom – see infra.
128 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2)(A); 1201(b)(1)(A). 
 
129 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2)(B); 1201(b)(1)(B). 
 
130 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2)(C); 1201(b)(1)(C). 
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Section 116A(4) takes a contrasting approach, but probably achieves similar 
practical results in that it exempts from liability the making or importing of 
circumvention devices131 for use only for a permitted purpose where the work in question 
is not readily available in a form not protected by a DRM measure,132 or for the purpose 
of enabling a person to supply the circumvention device only for a permitted purpose.133 
It may be difficult in practice for a manufacturer or distributor of a circumvention device 
to establish that the device is only used for permitted purposes relating to works that are 
not readily available in forms unprotected by a DRM measure.   
 
This again evidences the crux of the DRM dilemma when legislatures try to 
translate into statutory language a prohibition on circumvention technologies that may 
have the potential to be used for both legitimate and illegal purposes.  As a result of this 
dilemma, the Australian provisions arguably achieve the same thing in practice as the 
relevant provisions of the DMCA in the United States.  This is because, as noted in the 
Elcom and 321 Studios cases, devices with substantial non-infringing uses are also likely 
to have the potential to be used for a variety of infringing uses.  The realistic choice under 
DMCA-style legislation seems to be between a blanket ban on all such technology that 
would effectively restrict any legitimate uses of a relevant work, and a ‘free for all’ that 
makes such technology available but does little to stem the tide of digital copyright 
piracy.   
 
Importantly, we see here further evidence of the fact that blanket prohibitions or 
blanket permissions to market decryption devices may not work very well to protect an 
appropriate balance of interests in the digital age.  It may be that a more nuanced case-by-
case approach needs to be taken to ensure that legitimate uses are facilitated, and 
infringing uses are discouraged or prohibited in practice, particularly with respect to 
DRM measures that effectively prevent unauthorized access to a protected work.   
 
It may be that asking courts to make determinations about DRM access measures 
in the same way that they have traditionally made decisions about copying technologies 
as they have in the past - on a ‘blanket’ basis as to whether a particular technological 
innovation should be banned or not - is simply not realistic in this context.  If 
technologies like CSS code, Elcom’s eBook decryption format, and Studio 321’s 
decryption code are freely available to everyone, this might indeed be the ruin of some 
digital content industries.  If, on the other hand, these technologies are not available at all, 
 
131 ‘Circumvention device’ is defined in § 10 of the Australian copyright act in terms 
that reflect the DMCA’s conception of a circumvention device ("circumvention device" in 
the Australian legislation means: “a device (including a computer program) having only a 
limited commercially significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the 
circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of a technological protection measure”). 
 
132 § 116A(4)(a). 
 
133 § 116A(4)(b). 
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it may put an unfair burden on those who should have been able to utilize them to make 
fair use of a relevant work.  This might, in turn, stifle innovation in society.134 
It may be necessary, at least in the ‘access’ context, to replace the traditional 
‘blanket’ approach that focuses on circumvention technologies with an approach that 
focuses instead on an individual user’s legitimate needs in relation to a protected work.  
Arguably, the Australian legislation is a good first step in this direction in terms of taking 
an individual user’s particular interests into account.  However, it places unrealistic 
burdens on potentially unsophisticated users of copyright works.  An approach that shifts 
some of the burden of facilitating access to the entity making a profit from the 
commercialization of the work may be preferable.  This does not automatically deal 
comprehensively with the question of when, and how, to ban or regulate particular 
circumvention devices.  However, it ensures that restrictions on marketing such devices 
do not encroach unnecessarily on the exercise of fair use rights in relation to digital 
copyright works.   
 
2.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION
The first judicial determination involving § 116A in Australia was in the case of 
Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens.135 This was a relatively 
unremarkable case in many ways as it turned out to be a fairly straightforward application 
of the principles enshrined in § 116A.  Interestingly, the Full Federal Court on appeal 
overturned the first instance decision of Judge Sackville in part, but the difference of 
opinion turned on the definition of ‘technological protection measure’, rather than on the 
broader operation of the anti-circumvention provisions. 
 
The case involved Sony’s marketing of video game CDs for its PlayStation game 
system.  These video game CDs were encrypted with ‘access codes’.  The Sony 
PlayStation consoles read the access codes from the CDs and only allowed authorized 
Sony games with valid access codes to play.  Unauthorized copies would not contain the 
access codes, so the PlayStations would not play them.  The defendant sold ‘mod chips’ 
(also called ‘converter chips’) which could be installed in PlayStation consoles to 
overcome Sony’s access device.  The defendant also installed these chips into PlayStation 
 
134 See, for example, Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN L REV 1345 (2004) (suggesting a dispute resolution procedure to 
enable copyright owners to proceed against direct infringers and thus preserve technological innovations in 
file sharing technologies by reducing the likelihood of contributory infringement suits against those who 
develop and disseminate such technologies). 
 
135 [2002] FCA 906 (26 July 2002), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/2002/906.html?query=eddy+stevens, last viewed on July 14, 2004.  
This decision was overturned in part on appeal to the full federal court:  see Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 (30 July 2003), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2003/157.html, last viewed on July 14, 2004. 
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consoles for his customers.  Sony made several complaints against him,136 including a 
claim that he had infringed § 116A of the copyright act by supplying devices to 
circumvent technological protection measures. 
 
The difference of opinion between the trial judge – Judge Sackville – and the 
Appeal Court was that Judge Sackville at first instance took the view that the access code 
on the CD games could not be regarded as a ‘technological protection measure’ as 
contemplated in the legislation.  He felt that the definition required something more than 
a device which generally discouraged copying of game CDs by rendering the copies 
unplayable:  “There seems to be nothing in the legislative history to support the view that 
a technological measure is to receive legal protection from circumvention devices if the 
only way in which the measure prevents or inhibits the infringement of copyright is by 
discouraging infringements of copyright which predate the attempt to gain access to the 
work or to copy it.”137 
In other words, the access control measures incorporated into CDs and 
PlayStation consoles by Sony were regarded by Judge Sackville as having an insufficient 
link to any possible copyright infringement to be regarded as the kind of encryption 
measure supported by the legislation as protecting the rights of a copyright holder.  He 
rather regarded the access control measure as a mechanism whereby Sony could ensure 
that only authorized versions of their games were accepted by, and played in, their 
consoles.  However, the access control measures did nothing to prevent an unauthorized 
copyist from accessing or copying the video game software on a CD – they merely 
prevented any unauthorized copy from playing in a Sony game console.  There may have 
been a general deterrent effect on unauthorized copying in the sense that unauthorized 
copies were effectively useless because they could not be played in a Sony PlayStation 
console, but the access control measure itself did not specifically prevent access to the 
game software on the CDs, or copying of the software. 
 
The Full Federal Court overturned Judge Sackville on this point.  Judge Lindgren, 
in particular, took pains to go through the legislative history of the 2000 amendments to 
the copyright act in detail.  He concluded that a device that inhibits copying of a work in 
the sense of deterring or discouraging copyright infringement by denying access to, and 
therefore prevention of use of, an unauthorized copy of a software program (computer 
game in this case) is within the scope of the definition of ‘technological protection 
measure’.138 
136 These claims included general copyright infringement with respect to unauthorized reproductions 
of video game software in hardware components of the system, as well as trade mark infringement with 
respect to Sony’s trade marks incorporated into video games. 
 
137 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2002] FCA 906 (26 July 2002), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/2002/906.html?query=eddy+stevens, last viewed on July 14, 2004. 
 
138 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 (30 July 2003), 
para. 138 (Lindgren J judgment) available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2003/157.html, 
last viewed on July 14, 2004. 
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Although the results of this decision are ultimately unremarkable, given that the 
defendant did appear to be engaging in activities that could have adversely impacted on 
Sony’s Australian video game market, we again see a potentially far-reaching approach to 
the protection of proprietary interests in digital copyright works.  We also see the 
judiciary being relatively deferential to content industry interests, and ultimately 
preferring a broad interpretation of ideas like ‘technological protection measure’ than a 
narrow interpretation.  Additionally, in terms of policy, the Stevens case in Australia 
might have a general chilling effect on a variety of activities in relation to digital 
copyright works.   
 
For one thing, the decision seems to support attempts by digital content industries 
to utilize access control measures to regionally encode digital information products to 
avoid undesired parallel importing.139 Although the 2000 amendments to the copyright 
act are aimed at the prevention of digital piracy, they could likely also be used as an 
impediment to those wishing to engage in otherwise potentially lawful parallel importing 
activities140 where a case can be made that the defendant has interfered with a measure 
that could have an effect on copyright infringement.   
 
This could happen, for example, in a situation where a defendant trades in a 
device that could circumvent an access control measure in a Sony PlayStation in order to 
enable copies of authorized Sony games, lawfully purchased by a consumer, but 
regionally encoded for another jurisdiction, to play in a locally purchased console.141 The 
broad interpretation of ‘technological protection measure’ would likely prohibit the 
availability of the device even where it facilitated such presumably non-infringing uses of 
copyright material, provided that it could also be used to deter copyright infringement in 
the sense described by the Full Federal Court in Stevens.
139 See, for example, Alison Morr, Hong Kong's Copyright Ordinance: How The Ban On Parallel 
Imports Affects The U.S. Entertainment Industry And Hong Kong's Free Market, 21 HASTINGS 
COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 393 (1999).  Information property holders 
increasingly utilize regional encoding on digital works to prevent unauthorized parallel importing (also 
known as a ‘gray market’ in the relevant product). 
 
140 Parallel importing activities that create ‘gray markets’ in products are not per se legal or illegal.  
Their legality will depend on relevant circumstances and the prevailing regulatory attitudes in a relevant 
jurisdiction to such activities. 
 
141 It is suggested in the first instance decision in Sony v Stevens that the issue of regional encoding 
was raised but no argued fully.  At para. 108 of the decision, Sackville J noted that:“There is nothing in the 
evidence to suggest that the major purpose or objective of the protective device, from the applicants' 
perspective, was to ensure that the PlayStation consoles could only play PlayStation games lawfully 
acquired in Australia or Europe.  It may be that if the topic had been explored, the evidence would have 
elucidated the applicants' global marketing strategies and the role of the device in implementing those 
strategies. But the topic was not explored.” (Full text of the decision is available at:  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/2002/906.html?query=eddy+stevens,
last viewed on July 23, 2004). 
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The Australian legislation in general, although drafted differently to the DMCA, 
takes a similar approach and potentially creates a similar imbalance of interests in 
proprietary digital copyrights.  There is little to no real protection of fair use.  The 
statutory exemptions provided to the new prohibitions are somewhat vague and, in any 
event, place significant burdens on those seeking to exercise legitimate interests in digital 
content.  Overall, Australia seems to be moving in the same direction as the United States 
with respect to digital content management.  Like the American position, the emphasis is 
on blanket bans on technological devices that could facilitate unauthorized access to, or 
use of, a protected work.  This is understandable in light of the very real concerns of 
digital content industries to prevent digital piracy.  However, it is not in itself a 
sufficiently nuanced approach to protect legitimate uses of a copyright work that may not 
have been specifically authorized by the copyright holder.  A more sophisticated 
approach needs to be developed that can alleviate some of the content owners’ concerns 
while supporting the rights of those who wish to exercise legitimate uses of a copyright 
work. 
 
B.  DRM LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
1. THE EUROPEAN UNION COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE
The United Kingdom has been more guarded in its approach to the issue of digital 
copyright anti-piracy legislation than the United States and Australia, and is therefore an 
interesting model for the purposes of this discussion.  The British Parliament has been 
more focused on protecting an appropriate balance of competing interests in digital 
information products than many other legislatures.  To that end, it took a long time for it 
to consider the potential impact of legislation it might enact in implementing the DRM-
supporting provisions of the European Union Copyright Directive142 and, in fact, did not 
enact its legislation within the time period required under the Directive.143 The final 
British legislative package came into force towards the end of 2003 and has not yet been 
judicially tested.  In October of 2003, the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 
(UK)144 (the ‘CRR Regulations’) came into effect.  These regulations give effect to 
provisions of the European Union Copyright Directive145 that reflect the DRM 
requirements of the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996146 and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty of 1996.147 
142 Directive 2001/29 on Copyright and related rights in the Information Society [2001] OJ L1767/10.
143 The original deadline for transposing the requirements of the Copyright Directive into the law of 
individual European Union Member States was in 2002, but several Member States, such as the United 
Kingdom and Germany, did not implement the Directive in a timely manner, as it took them longer to 
sufficiently consider the implications of the legislation they needed to draft. 
 
144 S/I 2003 No 2498. 
 
145 Directive 2001/29 on Copyright and related rights in the Information Society [2001] OJ L1767/10.
146 WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, Art. 11. 
147 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996, Art. 18. 
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Article 6(1) of the Copyright Directive provides that:  “Member States shall 
provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any effective 
technological measures, which the person concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with 
reasonable grounds to know, that he or she pursues that objective.”  “Technological 
measures” are defined for these purposes in Art 6(3) as:  “any technology, device or 
component that, in the normal course of its operation, is designed to prevent or restrict 
acts, in respect of works or other subject matter, which are not authorised [sic] by the 
rightholder of any copyright or any right related to copyright as provided by law…”.148 
Article 6(2) of the Directive provides the ‘anti-trafficking’ provisions in relation 
to circumvention devices.  It requires Member States to:   
 
“provide adequate legal protection against the manufacture, import, distribution, 
sale, rental, advertisement for sale or rental, or possession for commercial 
purposes of devices, products or components or the provision of services which: 
 
(a) are promoted, advertised [sic] or marketed for the purpose of circumvention 
of, or 
(b) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent, or 
(c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or performed for the purpose of 
enabling or facilitating the circumvention of, 
 
any effective technological measures.” 
The provisions of Articles 6(1) and 6(2) are mandatory and must be implemented 
by all European Union Member States.  These provisions are tempered by Article 6(4) 
which requires Member States to:  “take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders 
make available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided for in national 
law in accordance with [provisions set out in Article 5] the means of benefiting from that 
exception or limitation.”  However, the Article 6(4) obligation only needs to be 
undertaken by national legislatures to the extent necessary for the beneficiary to benefit 
from the relevant exception or limitation, and where the beneficiary has ‘legal access’ to 
the protected work in question.149 
The kinds of exceptions contemplated here are set out in Article 5 and include:  
(a) reproductions of a work for private use;150 (b) use by public libraries, educational 
 
148 Art 6(3) of the Copyright Directive further defines an ‘effective’ technological measure as a DRM 
measure that ‘achieves the protection objective’.  This definition is obviously somewhat circular.  See 
discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright in the Digital Age:  A Comparative Survey, 27 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 333, 346-347 (2001). 
 
149 See Art 6(4) Copyright Directive. 
 
150 id., Art 5(2)(b). 
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establishments or museums;151 (c) use by social institutions such as hospitals and prisons 
that pursue non-commercial purposes;152 (d) use for scientific research;153 and, (e) use for 
public security.154 However, the provisions of Article 5 are discretionary, rather than 
mandatory.  The form of any such measures adopted at a national level is left to the 
discretion of each individual Member State.  This has created the potential for 
disharmonized implementations of exceptions to the anti-circumvention regulations 
amongst European Union Member States.  The specific implementation decisions hinge 
on the attitude each national legislature has taken towards balancing proprietary rights 
against competing interests in relevant information.155 Outside these discretionary 
exemptions, the Copyright Directive does nothing to guarantee any form of fair use of a 
copyright work protected by a DRM measure. 
 
Prior to the implementation of the CRR Regulations in the United Kingdom in 
2003, some provision had been made in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 
[hereinafter, the ‘CDPA’] for the protection of digital copyright works through anti-
circumvention prohibitions.  The pre-2003 legislation in the form of the original § 296(1) 
of the CDPA had made provision for licensed distributors to the public of a copyright 
work protected by a DRM measure to bring a copyright infringement action against a 
person who trafficked in a device or service enabling circumvention of a copy-protection 
measure.  However, this provision did not protect copyright holders to the same extent as 
the requirements of the Copyright Directive.  Thus, the new CRR Regulations incorporate 
a much more comprehensive anti-circumvention regime into the CDPA.  
 
2.  THE BRITISH COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS REGULATIONS
a.  Software Copyrights:  Anti-Device Provisions
The first thing to note about the current digital copyright legislation in the United 
Kingdom with respect to DRM measures is that it treats software copyrights differently 
from other kinds of digital copyright works.  This is because the Copyright Directive 
excludes from its operation matters already covered by the Software Directive of 1991.156 
151 id., Art 5(2)(c). 
 
152 id., Art 5(2)(e). 
 
153 id., Art 5(3)(a). 
 
154 id., Art 5(3)(e), Copyright Directive.  For a more detailed survey of potential exceptions to the 
anti-circumvention provisions of the Copyright Directive, see discussion in CORNISH, supra note ___, at 
811-812. 
 
155 See discussion in Lipton, supra note ___, at 348 [Copyright in the Digital Age]
156 Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (91/250/EEC).  
See Copyright Directive, Arts 1 and 11, and Rec. 50. 
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Thus, the separate treatment of software copyrights in the CRR Regulations focuses on 
maintaining the requirements of the Software Directive.  The additional provisions of the 
CRR Regulations that relate to works other than software copyrights are a new area for 
digital copyright law in the United Kingdom.157 
With respect to computer software copyrights, the original § 296 of the CDPA 
was replaced with a new § 296 inserted under the CRR Regulations.  The new provision 
focuses on computer programs encrypted by a ‘technical device’.  It sets out the rights of 
holders of computer software copyrights, and those authorized by right-holders to issue 
relevant computer programs to the public.  These rights are enforceable against those who 
traffic in a device or information capable of enabling or assisting the circumvention of a 
‘technical device’158 applied to a computer program.  There is no prohibition on 
circumvention per se with respect to computer software copyrights.  There is an ‘intent’ 
requirement for liability in sub-section 296(1)(b) to the effect that the defendant must 
know or have reason to believe that the circumvention measure in which she traffics will 
be used to make infringing copies of copyrighted software.  
 
There are no specific exemptions to liability set out in relation to the prohibitions 
contained in § 296.  However, it appears to be assumed, at least by some commentators, 
that this section should be read subject to a number of exemptions from basic copyright 
liability set out in earlier sections of the CDPA.159 Nevertheless, it is not particularly 
clear from the face of the regulations whether any exemptions are contemplated to the 
operation of the new § 296 prohibitions.  The prohibitions only relate to trafficking in 
circumvention measures, rather than in acts of circumvention per se. Thus, it is arguable 
that they should not impact on exemptions relating to copyright liability for engaging in 
activities in relation to copying a copyrighted computer program such as making a back-
 
157 See UK Patent Office, “Consultation on UK Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society: Analysis of Responses and Government 
Conclusions”, para. 6.4, available at 
http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/consultations/responses/copydirect/article6.htm, last viewed on July 15, 
2004 (“As enacted, s.296 of the CDPA already provided protection for TPMs, whether used on computer 
programs or other forms of works.  The consultation paper proposed to retain s.296, as amended on 
implementation of Directive 91/250, but in relation to computer programs only, and not other works which 
are now subject to Article 6 of the present Directive.  This remains the intention, but in the light of 
comments made by parties with particular interests in computer programs, the Government has concluded 
that it is desirable to make some further adjustments to s.296 in order to bring its wording into closer 
alignment with that of Article 7(1)(c) of Directive 91/250, which it is now the sole function of s.296 to 
implement.  These changes do not, however, alter the basic approach in s.296, and the Government has 
concluded that it would not be appropriate to make more substantial changes, such as the introduction of 
criminal sanctions in s.296 as was called for by some interested parties, particularly since the Directive now 
being implemented does not revisit existing provisions on computer programs.”) 
 
158 For the purposes of this provision, ‘technical device’ is defined in sub-section 296(6) as:  ‘any 
device intended to prevent or restrict acts that are not authorised [sic] by the copyright owner of that 
computer program and are restricted by copyright.” 
159 For example, see CORNISH, supra note ___, at 810 (noting that the CRR Regulations will likely 
dramatically expand liability for anti-circumvention other than in the case of computer software 
copyrights). 
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up copy,160 decompiling the program to create an interoperable program,161 or observing 
the operation of a program.162 
As with the DMCA, there is no provision allowing people who want to make such 
legitimate uses of copyright software to obtain the means to do so if they are not 
otherwise technologically able to do so.  If, for example, I own a copy of a copyrighted 
software program and I want to make a back-up copy of the program, but the program is 
digitally encrypted by a ‘technical device’ that prevents copying of the program, how can 
I engage in my lawful right to make a back-up copy?  Assuming I do not have the 
technological skill to circumvent the technical device myself, and manufacturers of 
circumvention devices ultimately stop disseminating the devices publicly because of fears 
of liability under § 296, there may be no viable way for me to exercise my legitimate 
rights to make a back-up copy of the program. 
 
This is obviously not the legislative intention behind § 296.  For one thing, the 
definition of ‘technical device’  is limited to a device that is intended to prevent or restrict 
acts not authorized by the copyright owner that are also restricted by copyright. Making 
a personal back-up copy is arguably not restricted by copyright in the United Kingdom.  
This is because § 50A(1) of the CDPA expressly provides that it is not an infringement of 
copyright for a lawful user of a copy of a computer program to make a back-up copy of 
the program for lawful purposes.  The problem is that many technical encryption devices 
are not sufficiently sophisticated to facilitate permitted uses while disallowing non-
permitted uses.  Again, we see the DRM dilemma at play here.  It is impossible to 
regulate the devices only in terms of illegal uses to which they might be put without also 
encroaching on the ability to use such devices for legitimate purposes.  Thus, we are left 
with a situation where the currently available legislative tools leave courts with an ‘all or 
nothing’ option on these issues.  Either circumvention devices must be completely 
banned or they must be completely unrestricted.  Both are undesirable outcomes, but 
there is little middle ground built into the current legislation to address the dilemma.  
Hopefully, an administrative mechanism of the kind suggested in this article would 
provide some such middle ground by effectively removing fair use concerns from the 
ambit of the ‘anti-piracy’ regulations.   
 
There is certainly no current legislative requirement with respect to computer 
software copyrights in the United Kingdom that copyright holders are obliged to provide 
people with legitimate interests in their software with the means to access or copy the 
software to make legitimate uses of the software.  Such uses might include making back-
up copies163 or creating interoperable programs.164 There is some provision in § 296A of 
 
160 CDPA, § 50A. 
161 id., § 50B. 
162 id., §§ 50BA. 
 
163 id., §50A(1). 
164 id., §50B(2). 
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the CDPA to override contractual restrictions on permitted activities in relation to 
computer software.  Statutorily permitted activities here include making back-up copies, 
decompiling software to create an interoperable program, and observing the functionality 
of software.165 However, these provisions only make an agreement purporting to prohibit 
a permitted act void to the extent that it prohibits or restricts a permitted act.  There is no 
affirmative duty imposed on the software copyright holder to facilitate technical access 
for a permitted purpose.  Such duties may be increasingly necessary in the digital 
information age due to the technological sophistication of many information property 
holders, and the concurrent lack of sophistication of many who wish to exercise 
legitimate, if unauthorized, interests in proprietary information products. 
 
b.  Works Other than Software: Anti-Circumvention and Anti-Device Provisions
Unlike the computer software copyright provisions in § 296 of the CDPA, the 
new sections relating to works other than software provide prohibitions on both 
circumvention activities,166 and trafficking in circumvention devices.167 Section 296ZA 
provides a right of action against a person who circumvents an ‘effective technological 
measure’168 applied to a copyright work other than a computer program.  Section 296ZB 
provides criminal sanctions for trafficking in anti-circumvention devices, while § 296ZD 
provides a right of action by a copyright holder or its authorized agent against a person 
who traffics in a circumvention device.   
 
The basic circumvention prohibition in § 296ZA applies to a person undertaking 
circumvention activities while knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know, that she 
is pursuing a circumvention objective.169 It provides for a cause of action, akin to a 
copyright infringement suit, by a copyright holder and anyone authorized by the 
copyright holder to issue copies of the relevant work to the public.170 Sub-section 
296ZA(2) provides exemptions for persons engaging in research into cryptography 
unless, in so doing, a relevant person prejudicially affects the rights of the copyright 
 
165 id., §§ 50A, 50B, 50BA, 296A. 
 
166 id., § 296ZA. 
 
167 id., § 296ZB. 
 
168 The component parts of an ‘effective technological measure’ for the purposes of these provisions 
are defined in § 296ZF.  Section 296ZF(1) defines a ‘technological measure’ as:  ‘any technology, device or 
component which is designed, in the normal course of its operation, to protect a copyright work other than a 
computer program.’  Section 296ZF(2) provides that a technological measure is ‘effective’ if the use of the 
work in question is controlled by an access control or copy control mechanism that achieves the intended 
protection.  For the purposes of the § 296ZF(1) definition of ‘technological measure’, sub-section 
296ZF(3)(a) further defines the concept of ‘protection of a work’ as:  ‘the prevention or restriction of acts 
that are not authorised [sic] by the copyright owner … and are restricted by copyright.’ 
169 CDPA, § 296ZA(1)(b). 
 
170 id., § 296ZA(3). 
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owner.  There are no general fair use or other exemptions from liability set out in the 
section,171 although there is a governmentally assisted remedy set out in § 296ZE for 
situations where the operation of a DRM measure prevents certain permitted acts in 
relation to a copyright work other than a computer program.   
 
Sub-section 296ZE(2) provides that where the application of an effective 
technological measure prevents a person from carrying out a permitted act in relation to a 
copyright work other than a computer program, then that person, or a person being a 
representative of a class of persons prevented from carrying out the permitted act, may 
issue a complaint to the Secretary of State.  ‘Permitted act’ is defined in this context as an 
act that may lawfully be done in relation to a copyright work by virtue of a series of 
provisions of the CDPA listed in Part 1 of Schedule 5A to the CDPA.  These activities 
include fair dealing for research and private study along with various other basic 
exemptions to copyright infringement relating to activities permitted by librarians and 
archivists, for parliamentary and judicial proceedings, and statutory enquiries.172 Notably 
absent from the list of permitted acts are fair dealing activities related to criticism, review 
and news reporting purposes.173 
This procedure provides the Secretary of State with a discretion to give the owner 
of a copyright work or an exclusive licensee of the work such directions as appear to be 
requisite or expedient for the purposes of: (a) establishing whether any voluntary measure 
or agreement relevant to the copyright work subsists;174 or (b) where there is no such 
measure or agreement in place, ensuring that the copyright owner or exclusive licensee 
makes available to the complainant the means of carrying out the permitted act to the 
extent necessary to benefit from the permitted act.175 Sub-section 296ZE(5) provides that 
it will be a legal duty of any person given a direction by the Secretary of State under this 
procedure to give effect to that direction.  This duty is owed to the original complainant 
or each member of a class of complainants, and breach of the duty is legally actionable by 
such persons.176 However, the procedure is only available to persons who have lawful 
access to the protected copyright work.177 
171 UK Patent Office, “Regulatory Impact Assessment”, Annex IV, p xvii (noting that no fair use 
exemptions are contemplated in the UK legislation or in the EU Copyright Directive), available at 
http://www.patent.gov.uk/copy/notices/2003/copyria.pdf, last viewed on July 15, 2004. 
 
172 The complete list of permitted acts referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 5A includes the following 
sections of the CDPA:  §§ 29, 32(2), 32(2), 32(3), 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 61, 
68, 69, 70, 71, 74, and 75. 
 
173 CDPA, § 30. 
 
174 id. § 296ZE(3)(a). 
 
175 id., § 296ZE(3)(b). 
 
176 id., § 296ZE(6). 
 
177 id., § 296ZE(10). 
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The advantage of this approach over the approaches in the United States and 
Australia is that it appears to take a more pro-active stance on balancing competing 
interests in valuable copyrights, rather than focusing on protecting the interests of 
copyright holders at the expense of other legitimate interests in a relevant work.  An 
attempt is made not only to protect and preserve legitimate interests in digitally encrypted 
copyright works, but also to give those protections some teeth with the assistance of the 
very government that created and strengthened the original property rights.  In particular, 
the British legislature has been prepared to impose affirmative legal duties on copyright 
holders and exclusive licensees of copyright works to give effect to an administrative 
direction made by the Secretary of State. 
 
The main problem with the approach as currently drafted is that the duties of the 
Secretary of State are somewhat vague.  The Secretary of State has discretion as to 
whether or not to act on any given complaint.178 There is thus no guarantee of 
governmental assistance for a complainant seeking to make a permitted use of a relevant 
work.  Further, even though the procedure imposes an affirmative legal duty on a 
copyright holder or exclusive licensee to facilitate permitted uses of a particular work, 
there may still be practical problems of enforcement if the beneficiaries of such duties do 
not have sufficient financial resources to enforce the duties in legal proceedings.  It might 
have been more effective additionally to provide some governmental assistance in taking 
proceedings to enforce such duties.  After all, governments are increasingly proving to be 
willing to bring criminal proceedings against those who are accused of infringing anti-
circumvention and anti-device provisions.179 It would seem only fair that the same 
governments should be equally willing to protect their individual citizens’ countervailing 
rights in relation to the same information products.    
 
Section 296ZB creates an additional criminal offense relating to trafficking in an 
anti-circumvention device.  The prohibited activities include various permutations of 
manufacturing, importing, distributing, advertising, or possessing a circumvention 
device.180 Most of the specific prohibitions relate to commercial activities.  Thus, 
possession of a circumvention device is only prohibited in the context of business 
activities.181 Presumably, possession for personal purposes would not be prohibited. 
 
178 Sub-section 296ZE(3) states that the Secretary of State may  give directions to the owner of a 
copyright work or an exclusive licensee to facilitate the complainant’s access to / use of a relevant work. 
 
179 For example, the United States government was very pro-active in the Elcom case in bringing 
criminal proceedings against the Russian programmer and his employer under the DMCA for infringing the 
legal rights of an American corporation.  It also encouraged the Norwegian government to take criminal 
action against the student who created the DeCSS code ultimately at issue in the Reimerdes litigation at the 
behest of the motion picture industry.  The British legislature has been prepared to institute criminal 
penalties for trafficking in circumvention devices:  CDPA, § 296ZB and the Australian legislature certainly 
did not expressly dismiss the possibility of criminal sanctions for infringements of § 116A of the Australian 
copyright act. 
 
180 CDPA, § 296ZB(1). 
 
181 id., § 296ZB(1)(c)(iv). 
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Importing a circumvention device for private and domestic purposes also appears to be 
exempted by the wording of the section which only contemplates a prohibition on 
importing such a device ‘otherwise than for … private and domestic use’.182 
Section 296ZB(3) carves out an exemption from liability for activities conducted 
by or on behalf of law enforcement or intelligence agencies in the interests of national 
security or for the prevention of crime, investigation of an offense, or conduct of a 
prosecution.  Section 296ZB(5) also provides a defense if the defendant can establish that 
she neither knew, nor had any reasonable grounds for believing, that the device or service 
in question enabled or facilitated the circumvention of an effective technological 
measure.  None of these provisions will give much comfort to the private individual 
wishing to utilize a circumvention device to make a legitimate use of a copyright work.  
They will only protect such individuals in particular circumstances from criminal liability 
for trafficking. 
 
The criminal sanctions on trafficking in circumvention devices are supplemented 
by the availability of civil proceedings under § 296ZD.  This provision follows the basic 
structure of the § 296ZA anti-circumvention prohibitions, creating a new cause of action 
for a copyright holder and for a person authorized by the copyright holder to distribute a 
relevant work to the public, against a person who has trafficked in a circumvention device 
or service.  There are no exemptions from liability set out under this provision.  Section 
296ZD(1)(b) of the CDPA refers to trafficking in devices or services which: (a) are 
promoted, advertised or marketed for the purpose of circumventing a technological 
protection measure;183 (b) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use 
other than to circumvent a technological protection measure;184 or, (c)  are primarily 
designed, produced, adapted or performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the 
circumvention of a technological protection measure.185 
This definition of a circumvention device or service is likely to raise similar 
problems of judicial interpretation as those currently arising under the DMCA in the 
United States and § 116A of the copyright act in Australia.  It is very difficult to ascertain 
on the face of any given set of circumstances whether a particular device fits these criteria 
if it is also capable of substantial non-infringing purposes, such as to facilitate a fair use.  
In any event, most devices capable of substantial non-infringing uses will also be capable 
of substantial infringing uses and so will likely run afoul of this section, as has been the 
case in other jurisdictions that have adopted similar legislative provisions.   
 
The legislative provisions described here from various countries evidence that the 
DRM dilemma has, in recent years, taken on a significant global dimension.  Even with 
 
182 id., § 296ZB(1)(b). 
 
183 id., § 296ZD(1)(b)(i). 
 
184 id., § 296ZE(1)(b)(ii). 
 
185 id., § 296ZE(1)(b)(iii). 
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increasing thought given to protecting legitimate interests in copyright works from anti-
circumvention legislation, the DRM dilemma persists.  This is because, as long as the 
focus is on regulating circumvention technologies, the resulting legislation will be too 
blunt an instrument to discourage digital piracy while preserving legitimate uses of digital 
copyright works.  The only way to resolve this dilemma is to take the legitimate use 
issues out of the equation and deal with them in some other way.  Circumvention 
technologies should be able to be regulated globally to combat digital copyright piracy 
while new mechanisms are developed to promote legitimate uses of copyright works.  
The administrative procedure set out in the new § 296ZE of the CDPA in Britain may be 
a useful move in this direction.  However, as noted above, there is still much room for 
improvement. 
 
III.  DIGITAL ENCRYPTION AND THE PRESERVATION OF FAIR USE
A. CRAFTING A FAIR USE MECHANISM FOR DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
ANTI-PIRACY LAW
So where are we now with the DRM dilemma?  The currently emerging picture of 
DRM legislation and judicial interpretations of that legislation globally is worrying in 
terms of facilitating legitimate interests in digital copyright works.  Such legitimate 
interests might include making back-up copies of software and decompiling software to 
create interoperable software products, as well as various scientific, technological and 
educational uses of copyright works, and even some level of private, non-transformative 
copying.186 The laws in different jurisdictions vary on the extent to which these kinds of 
activities are permitted under general copyright law or as defenses to DMCA-type claims.  
This really leaves two problems unresolved:  (a) identifying permissible uses of copyright 
works with any degree of certainty;187 and, (b) facilitating access and use of protected 
copyright works for those permissible purposes.  The following proposal seeks to address 
both issues. 
 
The current imbalance of interests is understandable because the problems of 
protecting digital copyright works are complex due to the nature of technologies currently 
available to access, copy and disseminate digital works on a scope and scale never before 
possible.  However, this imbalance does suggest that it is time to review the situation both 
domestically and globally with a view to developing a more nuanced approach to the 
regulation of digital copyright works that can promote legitimate interests in relation to 
those works while preventing digital copyright piracy.     
 
186 The issue of private, non-transformative copying has been particularly contentious in fair use 
jurisprudence in the United States.  It has been unclear whether such uses should qualify as ‘fair use’ in 
American copyright law: see Sony v Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  Some of these issues are 
currently being re-litigated in the Grokster file sharing litigation in the United States Supreme Court. 
 
187 Some may argue that ‘certainty’ here is neither desirable, nor possible.  However, some greater 
data generation on social norms in relation to fair use in the digital age would certainly be a useful 
development for the further evolution of copyright principles and policies into the 21st century. 
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If, for example, copyright holders were required to facilitate access and use of 
protected works for users seeking to make limited legitimate uses of a work, the 
regulation of anti-circumvention technologies per se might not be so much of a threat to 
the balance of information dissemination and use in the digital age.  This article suggests 
a simple administrative procedure to encourage copyright holders to facilitate such 
accesses and uses, while ensuring that copyright holders are still protected from digital 
piracy through the mechanisms currently in place to regulate the dissemination and use of 
anti-circumvention technologies.  This approach would not necessarily deal with 
problems created by anti-trafficking laws in terms of stifling innovations in decryption 
technologies more generally.  However, these issues would at least not be so immediately 
problematic to society if decryption mechanisms were required to be made available 
directly by content holders to those seeking to make legitimate uses of digital copyright 
works.  One could perhaps assume under these circumstances that any external market for 
decryption technologies might well be focused on facilitating impermissible uses of 
copyright works. Such a market would thus be appropriately regulated by aggressive 
judicial enforcement of the DMCA and similar legislation in other countries. 
 
The scheme suggested here for redressing the balance would require the 
development of an administrative mechanism utilizing an agency that could hear 
complaints brought directly by those seeking to make legitimate use of a copyright work.  
The agency would be empowered to make orders binding on a copyright holder to the 
effect that the copyright holder would be obliged to make access available to a relevant 
person for a limited stated purpose found to be legitimate by the agency.  If the agency 
did not find the use to be legitimate, it would dismiss the claim.  Any order made by the 
agency would be limited to the purposes stated in the order.  If a successful claimant 
made any uses of a work outside those stated purposes, the copyright holder would retain 
its right to either raise a complaint with the administrative agency or bring a standard 
copyright infringement action in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
The detailed operation of this procedure and some of the legal issues inherent in 
the suggestion are set out in more detail infra. They include questions involving: (a) how 
to determine whether a particular use is a fair use in this context; (b) ensuring continued 
access to courts in appropriate cases to review administrative orders made under this 
process; (c) how the procedure would impact on contractual restrictions on access or use 
to a protected digital copyright work; and, (d) the legal implications of elevating the idea 
of fair use into the legal basis for an administrative complaint against a copyright holder.  
 
Prior to conducting that analysis, it is worth noting that in the related context of 
examining the impact of modern digital copyright law on technological innovation in the 
peer-to-peer file sharing context, Professors Lemley and Reese have recently suggested a 
different kind of administrative dispute resolution mechanism.  To avoid confusion, it is 
important to briefly describe their suggestion, and to explain the difference between their 
ideas and the suggestions made in this paper.  The similarities between the two ideas is 
that they each involve the use of administrative procedures to better streamline the 
balance of interests in digital copyright works.  However, Professors Lemley and Reese 
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were dealing with different issues in a different context to the suggestions presented in 
this article.  They were concerned with providing administrative remedies for copyright 
holders in respect of direct copyright infringements by individual file-sharers.  This 
paper, on the other hand, deals with the flipside of that coin:  protecting legitimate 
interests of individuals to access and use digitally encrypted copyright works for 
permissible purposes. 
 
Professors Lemley and Reese suggested the development of a quick and 
inexpensive dispute resolution procedure that could refocus copyright holders’ attention 
on direct copyright infringements, and away from secondary liability actions, largely in 
the peer-to-peer file sharing context.188 Under their proposed mechanism, it would be 
easier and faster for digital copyright holders to bring complaints against direct copyright 
infringers, such as peer-to-peer file sharers, than is currently the case under existing 
copyright law.  The existing copyright framework generally requires time consuming and 
cost-ineffective litigation where a copyright holder proceeds individually against direct 
infringers who may, in any event, be difficult to locate.  Additionally, it may be difficult 
to generate sufficient evidence of copyright infringement against this class of infringers 
and, even if judgment was obtained against a large group of small scale infringers, the 
judicial remedies obtained would likely be inadequate to cover the damages actually 
suffered by digital content industries.  This is why copyright holders have opted to sue 
alleged secondary infringers such as the Napster, Aimster, and Grokster file sharing 
services.189 
Professors Lemley and Reese argued that if copyright holders were given a quick 
and inexpensive avenue to bring direct infringement proceedings against actual copyright 
infringers, they would be less inclined to proceed against secondary infringers, such as 
developers of peer-to-peer file sharing technologies.  This could potentially remove the 
chilling effect on innovations in the area of file sharing technologies.190 They suggested 
amending the American copyright legislation to allow a simple dispute resolution 
procedure for digital content holders to proceed directly against alleged copyright 
 
188 Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation, 56 STAN L R 1345 (2004); Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive 
System for Resolving Digital Copyright Disputes, University of California-Berkeley, School of Law, Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series (2004) (available for download from the Social Science 
Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract=525682). 
 
189 For a comprehensive discussion of the relevant litigation, see Alfred Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, 
and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, forthcoming CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 2005. 
 
190 Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation, 56 STAN L R 1345 (2004); Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive 
System for Resolving Digital Copyright Disputes, University of California-Berkeley, School of Law, Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series (2004) (available for download from the Social Science 
Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract=525682). 
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infringers without needing to involve any peer-to-peer file sharing service an infringer 
may have utilized.191 
The suggestion made in this article of an administrative procedure to hear 
‘legitimate user’ complaints is a counter-point to the Lemley-Reese approach.  Rather 
than advocating a mechanism to provide copyright holders with an easy, legislatively-
enabled avenue to pursue direct copyright infringers, this article advocates an easy, 
legislatively-enabled avenue for persons seeking to make a fair use of a work to bring a 
complaint directly against a copyright holder.  It imposes an obligation on the copyright 
holder to make the work accessible in appropriate cases.  The work could be made 
accessible with additional contractual and technological restrictions preventing further 
copying and distribution by a successful complainant outside the scope of the legitimate 
use identified in the relevant proceedings.  The underlying idea here is that a fair user’s 
interests in accessing and using a relevant work should be effectively protected by the 
government that has created the copyright protections and the additional DRM legislative 
supports for digital copyrights. 
 
This approach may not have the same impact on preventing the chilling of 
technological innovation in the DRM area as Professor Lemley and Reese’s suggestion 
would likely have in the area of file sharing technology.  This is because the 
administrative measure suggested here does nothing to preserve technological 
innovations in decryption technology per se. The presumption is that such innovations 
might, to some extent, be sacrificed if fair use could be preserved in other ways.  Fair use 
would then foster a different kind of innovation in society as a result of the ability of 
more people to use copyright works to make scientific, technological, educational, 
artistic, and literary advances. 
 
Another important point of comparison with the Lemley-Reese approach to 
minimizing secondary liability litigation is that the measures suggested in this article do 
not give anything additional to copyright holders, whereas the Lemley-Reese suggestions 
do give copyright holders an easy ability to sue direct infringers that they do not currently 
have.  This potentially removes, or at least significantly tempers, their motivation to 
proceed against those who develop and distribute, say, digital file sharing technologies.  
The approach suggested here to DRM measures, in contrast, might be seen as taking 
something away from copyright holders without giving them anything back.  In other 
words, it might be regarded as imposing additional duties on copyright holders to 
facilitate fair uses without giving them any commensurate benefits.   
 
However, this is arguably not the right way to look at it.  For one thing, if fair use 
has any real significance, it must be protected by the law.  It has certainly been assumed 
at some level in most relevant jurisdictions that fair use has some significance as a legal 
 
191 To this end, they suggest the insertion of a new § 514 in Title 17 of the USC.  Details of their 
proposed legislative mechanism are available in:  Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, A Quick and 
Inexpensive System for Resolving Digital Copyright Disputes, University of California-Berkeley, School of 
Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series (2004) (available for download from the Social 
Science Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract=525682). 
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right.192 Thus, the imposition of a requirement that a copyright holder employing DRM 
measures should facilitate access to a protected work for fair use purposes is not really 
‘taking something away from’ the copyright holder.  It is only requiring the copyright 
holder to facilitate a right in someone else that already exists.  If it is not clear whether a 
relevant right exists in any given case, this is also something that may be clarified 
through use of the administrative procedure over time.193 This approach may embody the 
kind of social bargain that should have been made when legislative measures such as the 
DMCA were enacted.  In fact, it appears to be the bargain that Congress was trying to 
strike in the DMCA.194 However, the actual drafting and subsequent judicial 
interpretations have not made that bargain sufficiently clear as exemplified by recent 
judicial determinations on the DMCA, involving fair use arguments.195 
A final point of comparison to make between the administrative procedure 
advocated here and the Lemley-Reese administrative procedure is that the latter is 
postulated as an alternative to an already existing judicial right of action.  Copyright 
holders currently have the option of bringing judicial proceedings against direct infringers 
(individual users) but, for the reasons suggested above, this approach may be more costly 
and unwieldy for copyright holders than an administrative proceeding.  On the other 
hand, the administrative procedure suggested in this article to facilitate fair use is not an 
alternative to an already existing judicial action.  Potential fair users cannot currently use 
their rights as a ‘sword’ to bring an action against copyright holders who deny them 
 
192 See, for example, MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (3ed, 1999), 428 
(citing Rosement Enters Inc v Random House Inc, 366 F 2d 303, 306 (2d Cir 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 
1009 (1967) describing fair use as a ‘privilege’); WILLIAM CORNISH and DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (5 ed, 2003) 808 (noting that 
British law has generally assumed that fair dealing exceptions to copyright infringement, the British 
equivalent to fair use, have generally been assumed to be constitutionally guaranteed rights of access and 
use, although there has historically been little actual debate about it). 
 
193 This is because over time the administrative procedure would generate more data relating to 
emerging social norms about fair use which would, in turn, help both copyright holders and potential fiar 
uses to know what kinds of uses are likely to be regarded as legally permissible. 
 
194 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(D). 
 
195 See, for example, United States v Elcom, 203 F Supp 2d 1111, 1134-1135 (2002): “[W]ith regard 
to the argument that fair use rights are impaired [by the DMCA], the DMCA does not eliminate fair use or 
substantially impair the fair use rights of anyone.  Congress has not banned or eliminated fair use and 
nothing in the DMCA prevents anyone from quoting from a work or comparing texts for the purpose of 
study or criticism.  The fair user may find it more difficult to engage in certain fair uses with regard to 
electronic books, but nevertheless, fair use is still available.”; Universal City Studios v Corley, 273 F.3d 
429, 458 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“the Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required, 
although some isolated statements in its opinions might arguably be enlisted for such a requirement.”).  
Further, as noted above, it is not currently clear that fair use is, in fact, a defense to a DMCA claim, at least 
in the United States:  Dan Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L REV 1095, 1137-1138 (2003) 
(DMCA makes no explicit provision for fair use with regard to the anticircumvention right itself, as distinct 
from the copyright in the underlying work); Universal City Studios, Inc v Reimerdes, 111 F Supp 2d 292, 
322, 323-324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); aff’d 273 F 3d 429 (2d Cir 2001) (fair use is not a defense to DMCA 
infringement); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property in the Digital Economy:  Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech LJ 519, 539 n. 108 (1999). 
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access to, or use of, a relevant work.  Fair use is only a ‘shield’ in the sense of a defense 
to a copyright infringement action.  Thus, the procedure suggested here would require not 
only determinations of the kinds of fair uses that would be protected by the administrative 
procedure, but also revisions of relevant copyright legislation to allow fair uses to be 
utilized as a sword: in other words, as the basis of an action or complaint against a 
copyright holder. 
 
One might argue that if the copyright legislation was amended in this way and fair 
use was legislatively elevated to the status of a legal sword, there would be no additional 
need for an administrative procedure to assist the complainant in asserting this right.196 
The complainant could simply go direct to a relevant court197 to enforce her rights against 
the copyright holder.  This would still be preferable to the current position because it 
would involve a third party – in this case a court –adjudicating an appropriate balance of 
rights and interests in a copyright work.  This is obviously superior to the current position 
where a potential fair user only has the ability to request access directly from a copyright 
holder who will often have little to no incentive to grant that access without the 
intervention – or at least threat of intervention – of a third party such as a court or 
administrative agency. 
 
The reason that an administrative procedure is advocated here rather than a 
judicial procedure is that an administrative procedure may be more easy to utilize by the 
classes of people likely to be asserting fair use rights in a DRM protected copyright work.  
Administrative approaches tend to be more flexible and less formal in their procedures 
than judicial processes and generally do not involve the expenses of a judicial hearing.  
All of these factors may prove more welcoming to the classes of people – individual 
users, educators, scientists etc – who may be interested in making fair uses of protected 
works.  This may well be the reason that an administrative procedure was adopted in the 
2003 revisions to the CDPA to facilitate permissible uses of a copyright work,198 rather 
than the option of creating judicially enforceable rights to facilitate such uses of copyright 
works.  Administrative procedures of the kind contemplated in this article are also 
generally faster and would allow for much more efficient generation of data about 
emerging social norms on fair use which could prove very useful in future delineations of 
the boundaries of the fair concept.199 
B.  DETERMINING PROTECTED USES
196 The author is indebted to Professor Thomas Nachbar for his thoughts on this issue. 
 
197 In the United States, this would presumably be a federal District Court. 
 
198 See new section 296ZE, CDPA. 
 
199 To some extent, some such data is currently collected in the United States under the triennial 
Librarian of Congress’ review of the anti-circumvention provisions: ss sections 1201(a)(1)(C)-(E) of Title 
17 of the United States Code.  However, what is suggested in this article is more comprehensive and 
perhaps more efficient in some ways. 
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 A number of legislative and executive steps would be necessary to operationalize 
the kind of approach described here to better protect fair use with respect to a digitally 
encrypted copyright work.  For one thing, the place of fair use within digital copyright 
anti-piracy law needs to be more clearly determined than is the case in much of the 
current legislation and literature.  At the very least, fair use should be formally 
recognized as a defense to the circumvention of even an access control measure if the 
purpose of the access was to make a fair use of a protected work.200 The elevation of fair 
use to a guaranteed right - or formal acknowledgment of fair use as such a right, 
depending on the perspective one takes of its current status - is necessary in the digital 
age.  It is particularly important in an era of digital locks and fences that fair uses can be 
protected by the law to ensure an appropriate balance of information usage in the digital 
age.  This means that fair use should be available to be utilized as a sword rather than 
merely a shield in the digital copyright context in order to ensure an appropriate societal 
balance of competing interests in digital copyright works.  If copyright legislation could 
be amended to clarify the nature of fair use as a clear legal right and the basis for an 
independent cause of action, both administrative and judicial, this would be an important 
step in the right direction.  
 
A procedure to better facilitate fair uses of digital copyright works could take a 
number of forms.  The basic underlying principle should be that it should not impose 
unreasonable expense on the potential fair user – or the copyright holder for that matter -  
but that it should impose some affirmative duties on the copyright holder to facilitate the 
fair use.  Where the balance of power with respect to DRM measures heavily favors 
copyright holders, it seems reasonable to impose some affirmative obligations on those 
right-holders to enable legitimate uses of copyright works to achieve an appropriate 
societal balance of interests here,201 provided that these obligations do not impose 
unrealistic financial burdens on copyright holders.   
 
Simply requiring a copyright holder to make some access and use available to 
identified individuals for limited stated purposes is not likely to be an undue burden.  
This could be achieved simply and cheaply by the copyright holder through digital 
means: for example, sending the relevant user a password to obtain limited access to a 
relevant work for the stated permissible purpose, or perhaps sending a hard copy of a 
relevant work (depending on the nature of the work) that could be photocopied by the 
 
200 This approach has been taken in two recent United States bills that have not been enacted into law.  
See Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.,§ 5(b) (2003) (allowing 
circumvention of a technological protection measure if it does not result in a copyright infringement); 
Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong., § 5 (2003) (allowing circumvention 
and/or trafficking in a circumvention device for purposes of making a non-infringing use of a copyright 
work in certain circumstances). 
 
201 For a more general discussion of balancing rights and obligations of owners of digital property 
interests, see Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property:  Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLORIDA LAW 
REVIEW 135 (2004). 
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user, but not digitally disseminated.202 The copyright holder could ensure protection 
against further unauthorized uses of a work by the fair user outside the scope of the 
relevant fair use by imposing additional contractual and technological measures which 
need not be dissimilar to those currently employed by copyright holders to restrict 
unauthorized access to, and use of, their works.  This should not put an additional 
significant burden on copyright holders if they have already developed these measures as 
part of their standard business models.  They may simply need to modify them to 
facilitate certain fair uses in given circumstances. 
 
The next task in establishing a procedure to facilitate fair uses is to identify the 
broad classes of uses that need to be protected.  This is, of necessity, a somewhat 
imprecise task, partly because the boundaries of the fair use defense in copyright law 
have never been particularly clear.  The advantage of this imprecision is its flexibility of 
operation.203 The administrative mechanism for enabling fair uses suggested in this 
article draws on this flexibility by ‘institutionalizing’ it.  The idea is to give an 
administrative agency the power to develop fair use categories over time to keep pace 
with changing needs of society.  Such a mechanism both keeps pace with social needs 
and generates data about developing social norms and expectations relating to fair use 
that can later be fed into judicial and legislative advances in digital copyright law.   
 
Although some would argue that fair use either cannot or should not be 
‘institutionalized’ in this way, it may be time to re-think the traditional position on the 
flexibility of the fair use doctrine.  Perhaps a significant amount of uncertainty in relation 
to the scope and nature of fair use was acceptable prior to the digital age when there was 
not such a significant concern about copyright holders locking up copyright works 
through the use of DRM measures.  However, now that digital technology has shifted the 
balance so profoundly in favor of those utilizing DRM measures to fence off all manner 
of digital information, it may be that more powerful competing interests need to be 
developed and effectively protected by the legal system.  Creating a clearer taxonomy of 
‘fair use’ type interests in copyright works that reflect emerging social norms about the 
balance of information usage in society may be a good way to start.   
 
Even if a taxonomy of fair use interests could be created over time to reflect 
emerging social norms in this way, any administrative agency charged with implementing 
a scheme such as that described in this article would need some initial guidance on the 
nature and scope of fair use in order to make its early determinations on complaints 
brought before it.  The agency might start by utilizing some of the uses that could have 
 
202 In such a scenario, a user granted access in this way could technically go to the trouble of scanning 
a relevant work into a computer and disseminating it digitally, but this would be a direct infringement of 
copyright if outside the scope of an access / use order made by the relevant administrative agency. 
 
203 Iowa State Univ. Research Found, Inc. v American Broad. Cos., 621 F. 2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“the doctrine of fair use … permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to foster.”) 
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been facilitated by technologies banned in recent DMCA litigation in the United States204 
as an early guideline, as well as the kinds of things often regarded as fair or permissible 
uses under general copyright legislation.  These uses might include things like:  (a) 
making a back-up copy of a digital work (DVD, eBook, CD, .mp3 file) lawfully 
purchased; (b) making limited copies for educational/classroom use; (c) accessing a work 
or making a copy, or a limited number of copies, of a work for a research team; and, (d) 
accessing and using a work legally purchased but regionally encoded for another 
jurisdiction.205 
These are familiar uses, some of which have already been protected as defenses 
against copyright infringement or anti-circumvention infringement, depending on the 
jurisdiction.  To simply allow these uses to have more ‘teeth’ in the sense of permitting 
potential fair users to assert them in an administrative proceeding seeking to gain access 
or use does not seem to be an unfair change in the law even from the copyright holders’ 
perspective.206 If these uses were already protectible as defenses to certain copyright 
infringement and related actions, they should be protectible in cases where copyright 
holders have utilized DRM measures to restrict access to, and use of, copyright works in 
a way that prejudices such uses.   
 
It may be that more commercially-motivated interests, such as reverse 
engineering a digital encryption measure to create a work or device that is interoperable 
with a protected copyright work might also be included in the conception of fair use for 
these purposes.  However, there are currently stand-alone legislative provisions that 
attempt to preserve these kinds of activities.207 It might be easier in the first instance, and 
less threatening to copyright holders generally, to limit the administrative procedure to 
protecting non-commercial uses of digital copyright works, or at least uses that do not, or 
are not likely to, commercially compete with current or potential interests of a copyright 
holder.208 
204 See, for example, Universal City Studios v Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d 
Universal City Studios v Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v Elcom, 203 F Supp 2d 1111 
(2002); 321 Studios v MGM Studios, 307 F Supp 2d 1085 (2004). 
 
205 This is an issue that has recently arisen in Australian litigation in the Sony v Stevens case.  See 
[2002] FCA 906 (26 July 2002), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/2002/906.html?query=eddy+stevens, last viewed on July 14, 2004.  
This decision was overturned in part on appeal to the full federal court:  see Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 (30 July 2003), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2003/157.html, last viewed on July 14, 2004. 
 
206 Even the simple clarification that fair use could be used as a sword (ie cause of action) in a judicial 
proceeding, rather than as a mere defense to a copyright infringement action would be an improvement 
here, as noted above. 
 
207 CDPA, §50B(2); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(1)(f). 
 
208 Some teaching and research purposes, for example, might be classified as ‘commercial’ but may 
well not compete with copyright holders’ commercial interests and so should be protected under a new 
administrative mechanism.  Working out whether a commercially interest might compete with a potential 
future commercial interest of the copyright holder will never be an easy task as current online file sharing 
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C.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AND ITS PROCEDURES
In terms of the administrative proceeding itself, copyright legislation might be 
amended to create a framework for an administrative mechanism to determine when, and 
on what basis, a particular fair use should be enabled.209 As noted above, any legislative 
amendments should first clarify that fair use can be utilized as a legal sword: that is, as 
the basis for a complaint against a copyright holder for denial of appropriate access to a 
relevant work.  The new administrative agency would make determinations on a case by 
case basis and would be empowered to make orders binding on a copyright holder to 
enable access and use for particular stated purposes, regardless of restrictive 
technological and contractual measures the copyright holder may otherwise have put in 
place with respect to the work.   
 
The parties to the administrative proceeding should also have an appeal 
mechanism available through the administrative body itself: for example, an appeal to a 
more senior administrative officer or panel of officers.  Ultimately, the parties could also 
bring an appeal before the courts.  The ultimate appeal to the judicial system is another 
important reason why the status of fair use should be legislatively clarified prior to 
implementing any scheme to protect such uses against unfair technological or contractual 
denials of access to a copyright work.  In this context, fair use should not simply be a 
defense to a complaint for copyright infringement – it should be a clear stand-alone legal 
right that can be enforced judicially as well as administratively.   
 
The administrative mechanism would not oust the courts’ jurisdiction, but would 
provide an inexpensive initial option for both resolving individual disputes, and 
ultimately generating some data on emerging social norms relating to the balance of 
interests in digital information products.  In contrast with a purely judicial approach, the 
administrative approach advocated here would enable more people to have access to an 
inexpensive and effective determination of their rights in relation to a particular copyright 
work.  Data generated by the new system about emerging social norms on fair use could 
usefully be fed back into the legal process to assist in future legislative and judicial 
determinations about balancing competing legitimate interests in digital copyright works.   
 
The 2003 amendments to the CDPA in the United Kingdom might be a good 
starting point for the administrative scheme suggested in this article.  However, the 
development of a simpler and less discretionary approach than that set out in the CDPA 
could be more useful.  Some problems with the British approach might arise due to the 
fact that the Secretary of State under the CDPA has discretion whether or not to make any 
 
cases in the United States demonstrate.  However, the generation of some data about social norms on fair / 
legitimate uses of copyright works, taking these potential difficulties into account as much as possible, 
would still be a useful step forwards here. 
 
209 This discussion focuses on a domestic approach to this issue.  However, the suggestions made here 
could ultimately be expanded to the international level, particular if an inexpensive online dispute 
resolution procedure were to be employed – see infra. 
THE DRM DILEMMA 
55 
particular investigations or orders.  The administrative system suggested here, on the 
other hand, is mandatory in nature: that is, the administrative agency must hear 
complaints brought before it, although it has no duty to make any particular order in a 
given case.  It must weigh up the evidence and representations made to it. 
 
The administrative agency contemplated here could be a stand-alone body or, in 
appropriate jurisdictions, could be a department established under the auspices of the 
Copyright Office.210 The dispute resolution agency – or department - could collect fees 
to hear a complaint about failure of a copyright holder to provide sufficient access to 
make fair use of a relevant work.  The fees may be sufficient to fund all or part of the 
administrative operation.  This fee requirement may also limit the volume of frivolous 
complaints brought before the agency.  Fees should be significantly lower than court 
costs, but their existence should operate as a deterrent to frivolous claims.     
 
Thus, the new scheme would do two important things.  It would establish fair use 
as a legally enforceable right against a copyright holder who is utilizing contractual or 
technological measures to restrict access to, and use of, a relevant work.  It would also 
establish a mechanism to facilitate the exercise of a fair use right utilizing a low cost, 
administrative procedure established under the legislation.  Thus, the legislation would 
create, or formalize, a particular conception of a fair use right that would enable 
administrative action against a copyright holder, but only in the limited area of seeking 
access to an encrypted work for particular, clearly delineated purposes.  These purposes 
would be set out in any administrative order granting access to, and use of, a relevant 
work. 
 
Both the complainant and the copyright holder would be entitled to make 
representations to the administrative agency with respect to the complaint.  Thus, the 
copyright holder would have to be given notice that a complaint had been made.  In fact, 
it may be a precursor to a complaint that the potential fair user has made a good faith 
effort to contact the copyright holder to seek access to a protected work for stated fair use 
purposes.  Building such a requirement into the administrative procedure may ultimately 
reduce the number of complaints heard by the agency.  If fair users were encouraged to 
make contact with copyright holders to seek fair use, and copyright holders were aware 
that failure to grant access for legitimate purposes might result in an unfavorable 
administrative order, private parties may over time become better at resolving these 
situations through private negotiations.   
 
210 Oversight by the Copyright Office would only be possible in jurisdictions with a Copyright Office, 
such as the United States.  Many jurisdictions do not have a copyright registration system and do not have a 
Copyright Office.  The dispute resolution procedure suggested by Lemley and Reese – supra - is focused 
on the American position and utilises a mechanism involving filing complaints with the Copyright Office 
and complaints being decided by an administrative law judge in that office:  Mark Lemley and R Anthony 
Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving Digital Copyright Disputes, University of California-
Berkeley, School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series (2004), suggested new 17 
U.S.C. § 514(c) (available for download from the Social Science Research Network at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=525682). 
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In fact, one of the indirect goals of the administrative procedure would be to assist 
in such private re-ordering of rights and interests.  This would be achieved both by 
encouraging greater co-operation between right-holders and fair users in this way, and 
also by gradually establishing social norms with respect to fair use through complaints 
actually determined under the procedure.  The identification and understanding of such 
norms would help private parties better determine their rights up front without needing to 
seek assistance from the administrative agency or the courts.  It would help copyright 
holders to know when they should grant appropriate levels of access to particular 
individuals, and it would assist those individuals to understand if and when they had a 
valid claim to access and use a given work for a particular purpose.  Although flexibility 
has been the norm in this area in the past, it may be that more certainty is now required in 
defining and operationalizing more precise categories of fair use interests, particularly in 
the face of the very real threat that copyright holders can unfairly monopolize all manner 
of digital information by utilizing restrictive DRM measures. 
 
The administrative agency could borrow a number of procedures from existing 
informal dispute resolution mechanisms, notably the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (‘UDRP’) adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (‘ICANN’) for dealing with domain name disputes in an effective and 
efficient, and ultimately global, manner.  The UDRP has a simple and straightforward set 
of forms and procedures for lodging complaints, and responses to complaints.  Most of 
the representations are done on paper or in electronic form.211 Formal in-person hearings 
are hardly, if ever, required.212 This enables simple, low cost determinations to be made.  
It also enables parties from geographically dispersed areas to have their complaints 
handled without the cost and expense of appearing before a particular court or body in 
any given jurisdiction.  This kind of procedure might ultimately be adopted on an 
international level for digital copyright complaints, given the increasingly global reach of 
many digital copyright interests. 
 
The agency would basically have two options in any given dispute.  It could either 
make an order binding on the copyright holder to enable access for stated purposes, or it 
could refuse to make an order based on an inadequate showing of a legitimate purpose.213 
If it made an order to enable access, the order would set out the extent of access and use 
permitted, and the copyright holder would have a cause for appeal to the agency and 
 
211 Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Rules 2(b), 3(b), 5(b).  Full text of 
Rules available at:  http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm, last viewed on January 24, 2005. 
 
212 Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Rule 13 (“There shall be no in-
person hearings (including hearings by teleconference, videoconference, and web conference), unless the 
Panel determines, in its sole discretion and as an exceptional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for 
deciding the complaint.”).  Full text of Rules available at:  http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-
24oct99.htm, last viewed on January 24, 2005. 
213 To some extent, this draws from the UDRP notion of the arbitrator(s) making a simple decision 
whether or not to order a domain name registrant to transfer a disputed domain name to a complainant.  The 
analog here is a notion of arbitrator(s) making a decision whether or not to order a copyright holder to 
permit a particular use of a copyright work.   
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ultimately to a court if the complainant thereafter misused the work in terms of exceeding 
the scope of the order.  The copyright holder could also impose additional contractual and 
DRM measures to ensure that a complainant did not utilize a given work outside the 
scope of a relevant order.  If a copyright holder objected to the making, or scope, of any 
given order, it could also appeal either to a superior level of the administrative body or to 
a court.  In terms of ‘levels’ of authority, the administrative procedure could allow for 
initial administrative determinations by a single administrator, with an appeal or 
reconsideration mechanism to a panel of administrators or to a more senior administrator.   
 
Although this may sound like it changes the status quo from the current position 
and unfairly burdens copyright holders, it must be kept in mind that the current balance 
tends to unfairly burden potential fair users who generally have less financial ability and 
less legislative and judicial recourse to protect their interests to access and use relevant 
works.  It is also currently unclear whether such individuals have any distinct legal rights 
to access and use copyright works in the first place.  Further, it is likely that many of the 
complaints brought before the administrative agency would presumably be small scale in 
scope and unlikely to raise too many concerns for a copyright holder in terms of the costs 
of granting access and use.  However, without the procedure in place, those copyright 
holders may have little to no incentive to grant any access to potential fair users.  Thus 
the imposition of a third party alters the balance to what it should arguably have been in 
the first place and simply gives copyright holders a little added incentive to facilitate that 
balance without requiring anyone to incur exorbitant court costs in so doing. 
 
All decisions of the administrative agency could be judicially reviewed if either or 
both parties were unsatisfied with the outcome.  The potential risk with this is that 
powerful copyright holders might hijack the system by constantly appealing 
administrative determinations to the courts.  However, this would still be less of a risk in 
terms of achieving an appropriate societal balance of interests in digital copyright works 
than the current system.  At least with the new system, there might be something on the 
record – an administrative order – supporting the fair use rights in the first place.  Thus, 
courts would have some evidence of an administrative agency being convinced of a 
particular legitimate purpose in a given case.   
 
Secondly, constantly appealing administrative orders allowing access and use for 
legitimate purposes may generate negative publicity for powerful copyright holders.  
Finally, the costs of such litigation, as opposed to the costs of enabling limited access for 
legitimate purposes, may not be worth the trouble for copyright holders provided that 
they could ensure through technological, contractual, judicial and administrative means 
that fair users did not exceed the rights granted in any given administrative order.  As 
noted above, it is likely that many of the complaints brought through the administrative 
proceeding would be small scale in scope and that it would not be particularly costly or 
difficult for copyright holders to implement relevant orders, nor should it significantly 
threaten the commercial markets for their works.   
 
In any event, this system could be beneficial to copyright holders.  If copyright 
holders and fair users could develop access and use strategies based on private 
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negotiations, facilitated by the administrative procedure, there may be less perceived need 
for legitimate users to seek out circumvention technologies in the first place.  They could 
be more confident of obtaining the kinds of access and use required with respect to digital 
copyright works without seeking out the very technologies that are of the most concern to 
copyright holders in the modern world:  those that might facilitate large scale digital 
piracy.  Copyright holders, by enabling some access to fair users, could lessen the social 
pressures to develop and disseminate decryption technologies that might also be used for 
large scale digital piracy as well as small scale fair use activities.214 It is unclear what 
kind of impact this might have on innovation in the ‘circumvention device’ area.  
However, it surely would not have a greater impact than the current set of laws that 
prohibit the marketing of such technologies on a significant scale, with little thought as to 
the needs of those who might utilize them for legitimate purposes.   
 
In terms of an administrative decision denying access to a copyright work in any 
given case, the question would be open whether the complainant could then appeal her 
complaint to a court within a relevant jurisdiction.  The suggestion has been made above 
that, whether an administrative or judicial approach is taken to facilitating fair use for the 
digital age, it is important that legal systems elevate fair use to the status of a legal 
‘sword’: that is, a stand-alone right that can support administrative and judicial action.    
If the right was to be so elevated, both administrative and judicial recourse should be 
available to a person claiming fair use in the face of access having been denied or limited 
through technological or contractual means by a copyright holder.  This article suggests 
that an administrative complaint should be the first avenue to assert the right, and then 
administrative or judicial appeal may follow in a given case. 
 
Because the administrative agency would be limited to one of two options in the 
first instance – making an order or refusing to make an order enabling access for a 
particular purpose – the procedures could be kept relatively simple and inexpensive.  This 
means, of course, that there are a number of difficult questions concerning copyright and 
fair use that the administrative agency would not consider.  These questions include 
whether copyright was validly granted in the first place for the work in question.215 This 
would be outside the scope of the administrative procedure.  The administrative agency 
would have a narrow mandate simply to make orders to enable access and use in specific 
circumstances where the ability to make a legitimate use has been compromised by 
technological means, perhaps bolstered by contractual restrictions.  The rationale for this 
is to redress the balance of interests that has become skewed since the digital content 
 
214 This might avoid situations such as that which arose in the 321 Studios case – supra – involving 
the manufacture of a device capable of facilitating both infringing and non-infringing uses of a digital 
copyright work. 
 
215 This question is becoming increasingly problematic in the digital age with respect to software 
copyrights in particular.  The recent appeal in the Lexmark litigation is a good example of courts revisiting 
issues relating to the initial copyrightability of certain classes of software code:  Lexmark v Static Control 
Components, 387 F.3d 522, 537-544 (2004) (majority holding particular software code to be 
uncopyrightable for various reasons including merger of idea and expression, application of scenes a faire 
doctrine and because the code operated as a ‘lockout code’ on the facts in question). 
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industries started utilizing DRM measures to encrypt their works against unauthorized 
access and use, and since those strategies have been bolstered in effectiveness by 
legislation such as the DMCA.  
 
When making determinations, the administrative agency could be guided by the 
factors currently considered by courts in making fair use determinations in cases of 
copyright infringement.  These vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, although 
certain aspects of the fair use idea are usefully gathered together in § 107 of the American 
copyright legislation.  These could serve as useful guidelines, and could be modified to 
suit the needs of the administrative proceedings.  The administrative body could, for 
example, be guided by the following modified applications of the factors set out in § 107.  
It could, in any given case, consider factors such as:  (1) the purpose and character of the 
use for which the complainant wants to access the work, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature;216 (2) the nature of the copyright work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion sought to be accessed and used in relation to the copyright 
work as a whole; and, (4) the effect of any permitted use upon the potential market for, or 
value of, the copyright work. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
Balancing the interests of digital copyright holders against the interests of those 
seeking to make a fair use of a protected work is an extremely difficult proposition.  The 
same technologies that enable content holders to market ever more attractive products 
also enable digital pirates to make fast, efficient, near-perfect copies of relevant works.  
Sandwiched in the middle of this equation are those who want to make legitimate uses of 
copyright works, but who are now effectively prevented from doing so because of the 
copyright holders’ increasing reliance on DRM measures whose effectiveness is bolstered 
by restrictive legislative schemes such as the DMCA. 
 
The administrative procedure presented in this article, coupled with attempts to 
clarify the nature and scope of the fair use concept, may be a good middle-ground 
solution that could help to strike a better balance between copyright holders’ interests and 
the interests of those seeking to make fair use of a digitally encrypted work.  The 
advantages are that it is simple, quick, inexpensive and straightforward, and it creates an 
environment that promotes a culture of enabling fair use and developing social norms to 
clarify the boundaries of fair use over time. 
 
It does leave certain questions open, including the impact of contractual 
restrictions on access to, or use of, a digital copyright work, as opposed to technological 
restrictions.  It has been assumed in the above discussion that an administrative order to 
enable fair use in a given case would trump a contractual restriction on such a use.  
 
216 Section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code actually contrasts ‘commercial nature’ with 
‘nonprofit educational purposes’.  The ‘educational purposes’ criterion has been omitted here to give the 
test a more general application and allow more flexible development of emerging social norms on fair use 
in the digital age. 
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However, that may be an invalid assumption.  It is possible that a law that establishes an 
administrative agency such as the one suggested here is not entitled to pre-empt 
contractual license restrictions on access to, or use of, a digital copyright work.  The 
answer to this question may depend on the constitutional basis on which any such law is 
enacted in a given jurisdiction.   
 
Another question left open is the problem of the use of DRM measures not to 
copy-protect a work, but rather to regionally encode it.  The relevance of digital copyright 
law to DRM measures protecting regional encoding is currently unclear, although the 
Sony v Stevens217 case in Australia suggests that copyright law will extend to protect such 
measures, at least under Australian law, if there is some indirect effect of discouraging 
copyright infringement.  If this is the case, then is it reasonable for any administrative 
mechanism protecting fair use to be empowered to enable fair use even in the face of a 
regional encoding measure?  In other words, should an administrative agency of the kind 
postulated here be entitled to order a copyright holder to enable fair use of a legally 
purchased, but regionally encoded, video game, movie DVD, music or software CD or 
DVD?  Arguably, questions such as this are in fact ideally suited to the kind of 
administrative mechanism advocated here, particularly if it is capable of generating data 
points over time with respect to emerging social norms on such classes of uses of a 
protected work.   
 
There is also the question of what impact the suggested administrative mechanism 
would have on markets for innovation in circumvention technology.  It might be argued 
that situating disputes about fair use firmly between the copyright holder and the fair 
user, without the fair user needing to rely on third party circumvention devices, might 
lessen the demand for such devices overall, at least for legitimate purposes.218 This may 
bolster the presumption that any such devices are mainly intended for illegal uses and it 
may, in fact, strengthen the position of copyright holders in combating the development 
and dissemination of such devices. 
 
Whether or not this is a desirable outcome, it is important to understand that 
markets for anti-circumvention devices are not doing so well under the current legislative 
schemes in any event, at least if the recent cases are anything to go by.219 This, coupled 
with the fact that copyright holders are increasingly bringing secondary liability suits 
against those who create digital copying and distribution technologies, such as peer-to-
 
217  [2002] FCA 906 (26 July 2002), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/2002/906.html?query=eddy+stevens, last viewed on July 14, 2004.  
This decision was overturned in part on appeal to the full federal court:  see Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 (30 July 2003), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2003/157.html, last viewed on July 14, 2004. 
 
218 This assumes that the predominant use for such devices would be by digital pirates if fair users had 
more effective avenues to gain access to a work for legitimate use purposes. 
 
219 See, for example, Universal City Studios v Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d 
Universal City Studios v Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v Elcom, 203 F Supp 2d 1111 
(2002); 321 Studios v MGM Studios, 307 F Supp 2d 1085 (2004) 
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peer file sharing services raise some broader questions of digital copyright law that are 
beyond the scope of this article.  Clearly the effective protection of digital copyright 
works has the potential to impact negatively on the production and dissemination of 
circumvention devices, and copying and distribution technologies.220 
These are difficult questions that need to be resolved over time as digital 
information markets develop.221 However, in the interim, it would be a shame if fair use 
was a casualty in the larger battle between innovation in copyright works and innovation 
in circumvention technologies.  Removing the threat of unjust encroachments on fair use 
from the mix would allow future debates to focus more clearly on the battle of the 
technologies without incidentally implicating legitimate interests in copyright works in an 
attempt to discourage illegal activities.  The DRM dilemma is not an insoluble problem.  
It simply requires a more nuanced approach, so that fair uses do not become unintended 
casualties in the battle of the technologies. 
 
220 Such as the online file-sharing software disputed in the Napster and Grokster litigation – see 
supra. Fore a more detailed discussion of the recent file sharing disputes, see also Mark Lemley and R 
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN L R
1345, 1356-1366 (2004); Alfred Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, forthcoming 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 2005. 
 
221 Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation, 56 STAN L R 1345, 1356-1366 (2004); Mark Lemley and R Anthony Reese, A Quick and 
Inexpensive System for Resolving Digital Copyright Disputes, University of California-Berkeley, School of 
Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series (2004) (available for download from the Social 
Science Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract=525682); 
Alfred Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, forthcoming CASE WESTERN RESERVE 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 2005. 
